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Objectives: The general problematic of social science research is located in individualized 
explanations of social and collectively based phenomena. This is due to methodological 
issues inherent in the way social research is conducted. Research on ingroup bias via the 
renowned minimal group studies is an exemplar of this general problem and is examined in 
this study. This research argued that explaining ingroup bias in terms of individuals’ 
psychological needs is insufficient. This is because the original paper and pencil test failed to 
account for the effects of social interaction and how the interaction unfolds over time. 
Consequently, the old problem of ingroup bias was revisited using a new technology: the 
Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL). 
Design: A within-subjects and between-groups experimental design was used. 
Methods: VIAPPL was used to replicate the original study but in a way that demonstrated 
how ingroup bias was produced in interaction over time. This was facilitated by the ‘Give 
and Get’ game, where participants allocated tokens to one another in a simulated game-like 
environment. A repeated measures ANOVA and social network analyses were used to 
analyse the data. 
Results: As predicted, 1) ingroup bias was found most likely to be manifest in social 
interaction characterised by group categorization, and 2) more ingroup bias was expressed 
when the group interaction is visible to those participating in the interaction. Ingroup bias 
did not amplify as the group interaction unfolded over time. However, there was evidence 
proving that ingroup bias is not static, as was previously thought. Instead, it changed by 
increasing and decreasing as the rounds of the game advanced. Furthermore, the 
investigation revealed that 1) participants distributed their tokens fairly when they acted 
with and without a group membership, 2) observing the interaction informed the way 
tokens were allocated in both individual and group conditions, and 3) reciprocity was not 
operant in the interaction. 
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Conclusions: This study introduced a new framework for studies in the minimal group 
paradigm (MGP) that allowed participants to interact in a virtual environment and 
enabled both traditional ANOVA methods and social network analyses. By rendering 
social interaction visible in the MGP, this study moved beyond an individualized 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
Social psychology research has mostly resulted in individualized explanations of social 
phenomena. While there have been groundbreaking attempts for a more holistic approach 
to the study of group related phenomena; methodological issues inherent in the research 
are apparent. The study of ingroup bias is an exemplar of this general problem and is the 
topic of this thesis. This chapter provides an outline of what ingroup bias is as well as the 
focus and organization of the thesis. 
 
 
What is ingroup bias? 
In Folkways, Sumner (1906) referred to ingroup bias as ethnocentrism which was defined as 
 
a view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything, and all others 
are scaled and rated with reference to it… Each group nourishes its own pride and 
vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on 
outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones…ethnocentrism 
leads a people to exaggerate and intensify everything in their own folkways which is 
peculiar and which differentiates them from others. (Sumner, 1906, p. 13) 
 
 
Sumner hypothesized that the distinctions between ingroups and outgroups were 
culturally based and perpetuated over generations. This definition highlights the essential 
features of ethnocentrism, including the belief that one’s own group is superior to 
outgroups and the inclination to accept those who are culturally similar and reject those 
who are culturally dissimilar:  
 
The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and 
war towards others-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war 
with outsiders are what make peace inside…. Loyalty to the group, sacrifice for 
it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without- 
all grow together, common products of the same situation. 
(Sumner, 1906, pp. 12-13) 
 
 
Therefore, the distinction between then ingroup and outgroup and the perceptions that 
each have of the other, impacts on and grows out of the relation between them. Thus, 
when interacting with one another, individuals’ act in ways where they favour, prefer 
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and support members of their ingroup to a greater extent than those individuals 
belonging to other outgroups (Sumner, 1906). The definition outlined by Sumner 
implies that ingroup bias is always accompanied by discrimination against outgroups as 
both inform one another. In contrast, Allport (1954) was of the opinion that being 
biased towards one’s ingroup did not necessarily imply hatred or contempt for 
outgroups as “Hostility toward out-groups… is not required… the out-group may be 
appreciated, tolerated, even liked for its diversity (Allport, 1954, p. 42). 
 
 
The disparity between the treatments of outgroups by Sumner and Allport allude to 
debates about whether ingroup bias involves both pro-ingroup attitudes and anti-outgroup 
attitudes or pro-ingroup attitudes, exclusively (Bizumic, Duckitt, Popadic, Dru & Krauss, 
2009; Brewer, 1999). Some have viewed ingroup bias and prejudice against outgroups as 
two sides of the same coin, however, it has been argued that “ingroup favouritism and 
outgroup prejudice are separable phenomena and that the origin of identification and 
attachment to ingroups is independent of intergroup conflict” (Brewer, 1999, p. 430). 
Despite pro-ingroup and anti- outgroup attitudes being unrelated under specific conditions, 
Bizumic and Duckitt (2012) argue that ingroup bias can lead to the development of 
prejudice, discrimination and ill-treatment of outgroups.  
 
 
Drawing on the work of Bizumic and Duckitt (2012) the key markers of ingroup bias 
entail a 
preference for the ingroup over outgroups, the perception of superiority of ingroup 
over outgroups, the wish to preserve the ethnic purity of one’s own group, 
exploitativeness (pursuit of ingroup interest without consideration for outgroups), 
the need for group cohesion, and strong devotion to the ingroup.  
(Bizumic and Duckitt, 2012, p. 890) 
 
 
These exalted notions of the ingroup, inform how individuals relate to their ingroup and 
other outgroup members. There is thus a differentiation between intragroup and intergroup 
expressions of ingroup bias (Bizumic et al., 2009). Intragroup ingroup bias is the tendency 
to consider one’s ethnic group with more importance than individual ingroup members. It is 
expressed as an individual’s devotion to their groups in an effort to strive for group 
cohesion and ingroup positivity. Intergroup ingroup bias on the other hand, is where the 
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ingroup is considered more important than the outgroup. It is expressed as supporting, self-
glorifying and superior attitudes of ingroups, preference for and a readiness to defend the 
ingroup, a rejection of interaction with outgroups and pursuing ingroup interests at the 
expense of outgroups (Bizumic et al., 2009). Even though these forms of ingroup bias differ 
on individual and group levels, they reinforce one another because importance of the 
ingroup is fundamental in both instances. 
 
 
This outline highlighted ingroup bias primarily as an attitudinal construct that is manifest in 
social interaction. Since preference for ingroups over outgroups is the fundamental feature 
of this phenomenon, it is therefore expressed as a readiness to favour or act in ways that 
bias the ingroup over the outgroup whatever the situation (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). Thus, 
ingroup bias is conceptualized as such. 
 
 
The focus and organization of this thesis 
This thesis begins by outlining traditional research on ingroup bias and critically examines 
individual explanations of this social phenomenon. Social theories of ingroup bias are then 
presented. Of particular interest to this thesis is the pioneering MGP which was formally 
reported by Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament (1971). This research initially explained 
ingroup bias in terms of norms operant in the context. But, the theory was later revised and 
explained in terms of one’s psychological need to attain a positive social identity (Billig & 
Tajfel, 1973). Replicated in numerous studies, the legacy of the MGP is undoubted. 
However “In the social sciences, works of the highest intellectual quality always repay 
critical re-examination, for even their limitations and omissions can be revealing…To argue, 
however, is not necessarily to reject, but to develop” (Billig, 2002, p. 172). In this spirit, this 
thesis provides a critique of the MGP as a methodology and individualized explanations of 
ingroup bias. It revisits the original minimal group study to investigate the old problem of 
ingroup bias with a new technology and provides a social explanation of the behaviours 
operant in a novel minimal group interaction.  
 
 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter two contains the literature review and it 
concludes with the research aims, rationale and hypotheses. Chapter three covers the 
methodology and chapter four, the results. Chapter five includes the Social Network 
Analysis (SNA) of the data. Chapter six comprises the discussion and conclusion. The 
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reference list and appendices follow thereafter. 
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Chapter two: Literature review  
 
This chapter presents a discussion of the main individual and social theories of ingroup bias. 
 
It is argued that both are unable to adequately account for this phenomenon due to 
limitations in their approaches. Consequently an alternative methodology is proposed. The 
chapter concludes with an outline of the aims, rationale and hypotheses of this research. 
 
 
Individual theories of ingroup bias 
  Traditionally, the role of the individual was given prominence in social psychology because 
 
“all activities in society- economic, political, artistic- have their center in individuals, in 
their strivings, needs, and understanding. The individual is the point of intersection of 
nearly all that is of consequence in the social sphere” (Asch, 1952, p. 4). Accordingly, 
ingroup bias was initially explained in terms of the individual. This section considers three 
individually centered explanations of ingroup bias; namely authoritarianism, frustration-




The ‘authoritarian personality’ theory ascribed prejudice against others to a pathology or 
 
dysfunction in the personality of the individual. It was believed that repression of one’s 
basic instinctual drives, due to constraints of social life, was a normal phase of personality 
development. In addition, a balance between self-expression and rigidly sticking to the 
conventions of society was required. However, those individuals’ exposed to punitive 
childrearing rearing practices and whose parents demanded that their behaviour conform to 
social conventions were unable to develop a normal personality. Instead, they repressed 
their internal conflicts, hostility and aggression that were directed at the parental authority. 
Those were then then outwardly displaced onto less powerful others because of a more 
powerful need to submit to the authoritative figure. As a result, these individuals developed 
authoritarian traits, expressed in their behaviours of displaying hostility, intolerance and 
derogation towards outgroups (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). 
 
 
Evidence for correlates with ingroup bias 
In their research on group relations and prejudice, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson 
and Sanford (1950) developed the Ethnocentrism (E) scale and concluded that individuals 
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favoured their ingroups primarily because of their psychological makeup. This behaviour 
was attributed to how they assimilated their experiences with particular group stereotypes 
and how they identified with particular groups (Adorno et al., 1950). 
 
 
The rigid and inflexible way of thinking that was attributed to those who favoured their 
ingroups was explored by Rokeach (1948). He found that highly prejudiced individuals 
solved problems in a more rigid manner and showed greater concreteness of thought than 
individuals who were less prejudiced (Rokeach, 1948). Furthermore Frenkel-Brunswick 
(1949, as cited in Block and Block, 1951) showed that individuals with an authoritarian 
personality also displayed an intolerance for ambiguity as they had a need to structure their 
world. Drawing on this, Block and Block (1951) found a positive association between 
intolerance for ambiguity and ingroup bias, explained by “the individual’s characteristic 
means of handling or mediating both his internal need tensions and the demands imposed 
upon him by the external world” (Block & Block, 1951, p. 310). Thus, ingroup bias was 
explained in terms of the personality-driven need to cope with internal and external 
demands of one’s environment and how information is processed. 
 
 
Downing and Monaco (1986) used the California Fascism (F) scale, a predictor of 
ethnocentrism (Adorno et al., 1950) to highlight the relation between authoritarianism and 
ingroup bias. Their results indicated that under various in- and outgroup contact conditions, 
those who were regarded as authoritarian displayed higher levels of ingroup bias than those 
less authoritarian participants, even when groups did not interact. Even though both high 
and low authoritarian participants were aware of the group differentiation, the lack of a 
personality-based motivation to show a bias may be the reason why no bias occurred for 
non-authoritarian participants. It was therefore concluded that “This finding favours 
personality theory…as most basic to an understanding of in-group/out-group bias” 
(Downing & Monaco, 1986, p. 451). 
 
 
Despite this evidence, the authoritarian personality theory was unable to explain how 1) 
individuals who are not classified as authoritarian or ethnocentric, manifest strong ingroup 
bias and hostility towards outgroups, 2) ingroup bias does not necessarily result in outgroup 
hostility, and 3) changes in outgroup hostility can also be related to social and contextual 
conditions (Brown, 1988). Although Altemeyer (1994, as cited in Perreault & Bourhis, 
1999) was able to show that authoritarian individuals rated their ingroup more positively, 
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the link between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism as a discriminatory behaviour was not 
explored. In addition to critique of the design and integrity of the F scale (Brown, 1965), 
Duckitt (1989) highlighted that the authoritarian personality theory was initially developed 
to explain social phenomena “such as ethnocentrism, prejudice, intergroup hostility” 
(Duckitt, 1989, p. 68). However, this intention was lost to an explanation focusing mainly 




The ‘frustration-aggression’ theory proposed that frustration at the inability to accomplish 
basic or superordinate goals resulted in the development of aggression within the individual. 
Since this aggression could not be contained, it was either cathartically released during 
sporting activities or was redirected onto ‘convenient scapegoats’ i.e. outgroups. This 
occurred either because of learned difficulties with challenging authoritative figures or 
because of the inaccessibility of the original source of the frustration (Dollard et al., 1939, as 
cited in Brown, 1988). Thus according to this theory, the individual’s frustrations caused by 
the conventions of organized society, resulted in aggression directed toward outgroups. 
 
 
Evidence for correlates with ingroup bias 
At a summer camp, Miller and Bugelski (1948, as cited in Brown, 1988) assessed young 
 
mens’ attitudes towards two minority groups (pre-test) and thereafter provoked them to 
become frustrated. Their attitudes were once again tested (post-test) and it was found 
that prejudice towards minority groups was significantly higher in the post-test 
compared to the pre-test. They concluded that although the men were angry with the 
experimenters, their aggression was displaced onto the minority groups, thus explaining 
the increase in prejudice in the post-test (Miller & Bugelski, 1948, as cited in Brown, 
1988). While this study provided evidence in support of the frustration-aggression 




This theory neglects the role of social learning and context in whether aggression is 
manifest or not (Bandura, 1973 as cited in Berkowitz, 1989). There is also a problem 
with assuming that frustration is a sufficient and necessary condition for aggression to be 
manifest (Baron, 1977, as cited in Berkowitz, 1989). Cowen, Landes and Schaet’s (1959) 
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suggested that there are other mediating factors to the expression of prejudice after one 
experiences frustration and aggression. They found an increase in “anti-Negro feelings 
following frustration” (Cowen, Landes & Schaet, 1959, p. 36) despite little change in 
prejudice scores for other minority groups and concluded that “anti-Negro feelings seem 
to constitute a preferred prejudice in informal conversations of undergraduates at this 
institution” (Cowen, Landes & Schaet, 1959, p. 37). Thus, the perception of minority 
groups in a particular context at a particular point in time impacts upon anti-outgroup 
attitudes as aggression against outgroups is manifest only in contexts where there is 
social consensus about the legitimacy of aggression in that particular situation (Tajfel, 
1978a). The role of the context was addressed by the social dominance orientation. 
While conflict may be an important factor, the status of the group influences how they 
are perceived and subsequently treated. In their study Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and 
Malle (1994) proved that high-status groups demonstrated higher levels of ingroup 
identification and were more ingroup serving than low-status groups, in efforts to 
maintain distinct hierarchical relations between the groups (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth 
& Malle, 1994). Furthermore, Grant and Brown (1995) found that groups who were more 
collectively deprived were more likely to engage in social protests and favour their 
ingroups than non-deprived groups. 
 
 
This theory was limited in its ability to account for the mediating factors which impact 
upon whether ingroup bias is manifest or not. Consequently, there was a shift in focus, to 




In order to simplify the vast amount of stimuli to which we are exposed and to follow 
 
normative behaviour, Allport (1954) noted that cognitive categories are employed to assist 
with information processing. Serving both social and cognitive demands, when perceiving 
information about individuals one categorizes them into specific groups based on their 
similarities and differences (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). This is because “The human 
mind must think with the aid of categories…Once formed, categories are the basis for 
normal prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process. Orderly living depends on it” 
(Allport, 1954, p. 20). Supporting evidence by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) showed that 
participants exaggerated the similarities in length between a line and the category to 
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which it belonged and exaggerated the differences in length between the categories. This 
exaggeration was absent when lines were presented to participants without their denoting 
categories (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). Thus imposition of the line’s category impacted upon 
further judgment of its length and the similarity or difference to its category.  
 
 
Similarly, stereotypes about ingroups and outgroups impose upon how one relates to these 
groups. Via categorization one differentiates between groups that one belongs to (i.e. 
ingroups) and all other groups with whom one does not identify (i.e. outgroups). 
However, the ingroup-outgroup distinction is sometimes exaggerated. Hamilton and 
Trolier (1986) argue that one may perceive greater within-group similarities and between-
group differences, even if the similarities and differences are unfounded. Accordingly, 
prejudice was viewed as a normal by-product of everyday thinking since “erroneous 
generalization and hostility- are natural and common capacities of the human mind 
(Allport, 1954, p. 39). 
 
 
Once groups gain social recognition they are given value laden connotations i.e. stereotypes 
which perpetuate the similarities within groups and differences between them. This 
particular way of thinking impacts upon how we relate to groups because stereotypes 
“justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that category” (Allport, 1954, p. 191). We 
favour those we perceive more alike to us “Because of their basic importance to our own 
survival and self- esteem we tend to develop a partisanship and ethnocentrism in respect to 
our in-groups…The familiar is preferred. What is alien is regarded as somehow inferior, 
less “good,” ” (Allport, 1954, p. 42). 
 
 
Evidence for correlates with ingroup bias 
Doise (1976, as cited in Tajfel, 1978b) studied the ratings of the positive and negative 
 
attributes of one’s ingroup and outgroup. In the second round of ratings, where participants 
knew that they would be rating the outgroup immediately after the ingroup, the ratings of 
the ingroup were significantly more positive than the outgroup. Thus, the presence of an 
intergroup differentiation, combined with the value laden connotations designated to each 
group resulted in ingroup bias being demonstrated (Doise, 1976, as cited in Tajfel, 1978b). 
Similarly Purdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, and Tyler (1990) examined whether group 
designators (“we” implying ingroup category and “they” implying outgroup category) 
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enabled an automatic positive or negative association with a particular group. They used 
positive and negative adjectives to describe categories of ingroups and outgroups and found 
an automatic association between the ingroup identifier “us” with the adjective “good”, and 
outgroup identifier “them” with the adjective “bad”. Reaction times for positive traits 
associated with the “we” category were faster than positive traits associated with the “they” 
category, demonstrating a bias for the ingroup. These results demonstrated the automaticity 
with which group differentiation occurred and its impact upon how ingroups and outgroups 
were evaluated (Purdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990). 
 
 
Going a step further, Paladino and Castelli (2008) examined the behavioural and 
interactional consequences of group categorizations. Based on the notion that intergroup 
differentiation results in pro-ingroup and anti-outgroup attitudes, these authors 
hypothesized that after being categorized into groups individuals would be automatically 
more likely to approach their ingroups and avoid outgroups. They found that approach-like 
behaviours were performed faster toward the ingroup than outgroup, for already established 
groups. This was also the case for minimal groups even in the absence of personal 
interaction. This suggests that prior experience with a group is not necessary to activate 
approach and avoidance behaviours towards ingroups and outgroups, respectively. The 
authors proposed that cognitive perception cannot be considered in isolation since there is 
an activation of the typical behaviours associated with what is perceived. Individuals are 
also likely to repeat behaviours towards the same targets. Thus, thinking in terms of group 
categories automatically predisposes one to act in a typical manner towards that group 
namely, approaching ingroups and avoiding outgroups (Paladino & Castelli, 2008). 
 
 
The merit of the cognitive approach lies in its ability to address how basic cognitive 
 
apparatus and socially derived stereotypical beliefs, together impact upon how groups 
interact with one another. However, it also presents a limited view of the individual who 
responds to groups only in the terms suggested and required by their accompanying 
stereotype. This approach presents a rather pessimistic view of humanity as prejudice is 
regarded as something that is innate, universal to all and therefore inevitable (Billig, 2002). 
However, those who view prejudice as a language category, argue that language is used 
“flexibly and, thus, are not restricted merely to minimizing within-category differences or 
between-category similarities” (Billig, 2002, p. 176). Evidence where the outgroup is 
favoured over other ingroups (Noel, Wann & Branscombe, 1995; Brewer & Campbell, 
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1976) demonstrates how this approach is incapable of dealing with the variability of social 
contexts and the infinite possibility of how to respond to groups. 
 
 
The problem with individual based approaches 
Individual based theories have been criticized for their psychological and cognitive focus. 
 
The emphasis on individual motivations provides a reductionist and individualized view 
of ingroup bias. It neglects the associated situational and sociocultural factors and 
individuals’ “participation in more complex social behaviour” (Milner, 1981, as cited in 
Turner & Giles, 1981, p. 104). In addition to not addressing how historical changes 
contribute to ingroup bias, these theories also overlook the uniformity across different 
groups prejudice to outgroups, over different times and in different places (Brown, 
1988). Their applicability to a social theory of ingroup bias is limited as it provides an 
“’individualistic’ view of a human being’s social psychological function” (Tajfel, 1978a, 
p. 433). Instead, Allport insisted that 
 
 
a multiple approach is required…historical, sociocultural, and situational analysis, 
as well as from analysis in terms of socialization…and finally, but not least 
important, in terms of actual group differences. To understand prejudice and its 
conditions the results of investigations at all these levels must be kept in mind. 
(Allport, 1954, p. 514) 
 
 
This motivated a change in the way ingroup bias was subsequently researched. 
 
 
The quest for a social theory of ethnocentrism 
Bizumic and Duckitt (2012) assert that most social theories explaining intergroup behaviour 
 
are based on identity. This is because when individuals acquire a group membership, they 
define themselves according to that category and view themselves to be similar to their 
group members. Over time, the group is considered important resulting in the group’s 
interests surpassing the interests of individual members’ and other outgroups’ and this 
informs the relations between groups (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012). In this section the 
influence of social norms and group conflict are presented. Thereafter an in-depth 





Social norm theory 
Sumner (1906) discussed the concept of ‘folkways’ which are the appropriate ways of acting 
 
in a particular context. He noted that via learning, these actions were taken up, imitated 
and perpetuated over time. As a result they became established as normative. Sumner 
described norms as constraints on behaviour which “exerts a strain on every individual 
within its range; therefore it rises to a societal force to which great classes of societal 
phenomena are due” (Sumner, 1906, p. 3). To illustrate this, the autokinetic illusion study 
demonstrated how norms established within a group setting affect group behaviour 
(Sherif, 1937). When asked to establish the range of movement of a flashing light under 
individual conditions of the autokinetic illusion experiment, each participant offered their 
own subjective range. However, under the group condition where there was a pre-
established norm for the range of movement; participants’ assessments were akin to that 
of the established group norm (Sherif, 1937). 
 
 
Further evidence provided by Asch (1956) demonstrated how individuals’ judgments were 
influenced by those belonging to the majority group in a perceptual task. When publically 
reporting on the similarity between the lengths of lines on two cards, it was found that 
participants made more errors that were similar to the incorrect judgments reported by the 
pseudo-participants (majority group members who were secretly primed to report false 
answers). Reports from the post experimental interview indicated that even though 
participants knew that the answers were incorrect, they reported them so as to align their 
responses with that of the majority group (Asch, 1956).  These results portray the 
normative and informational influence that groups have on individuals.  
 
This was also explored by Deutsch and Gerard (1995) in a modified version of the Asch 
experiment. They found that 1) normative social influence on individuals’ ratings were 
stronger for individuals belonging to a group as opposed to those with no group 
membership, 2) normative social influence was less when individuals perceived their 
assessments to be anonymous or when there was no pressure to conform, 3) normative 
social influence to conform to one’s own judgment reduces the propensity to conform to 
the influence of others, 4) normative social influence to conform to one’s own judgment 
from another and oneself is stronger than the influence from oneself alone, and 5) 
individuals were more susceptible to normative social influence when uncertain about their 
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own judgments (Deutsch & Gerard, 1995). 
 
 
Evidence for correlates with ingroup bias 
Hertel and Kerr (2001) argued that ingroup bias occurs because it is a socially sanctioned 
and acceptable way of behaving in particular contexts. In their study participants were 
primed to either exhibit loyalty or equality in their allocations to others participants. Their 
results provide evidence for increased ingroup bias when the norm of loyalty was 
encouraged compared to the norm of equality. Hertel and Kerr (2001) argued that 
participants discriminated as such because of it being a “socially approved behaviour” 
(Hertel & Kerr, 2001, p. 322). Since ingroup identification was also found to be greater 
when the norm of loyalty was encouraged it was suggested that identification with the 
ingroup is not something that precedes ingroup favouritism but rather occurs as a result of 
the norms that guide behaviour (Hertel & Kerr, 2001). 
 
 
This evidence suggests that individuals favour their ingroups because of the norms that 
guide behaviour. However, it is a cognitive based understanding of norms since 
individuals “search their memory for appropriate normative scripts that give meaning to 
the situation and clear prescriptions for behaviour” (Hertel & Kerr, 2001, p. 317). In as 
much as Hertel and Kerr (2001) demonstrated how ethnocentric behaviours develop and 
are mediated by the specific context in which the interaction occurs, the norms 
delineating such behaviours remain as pre-defined cognitive schema. The explanation for 
this behaviour is once again centered on the individual. Furthermore, the explanation 
tends toward circularity as the norm is both the reason for and the explanation of ingroup 
bias and it does not account for instances where individuals do not act in accordance with 
the dominant ingroup bias norm (Brewer, 2007). 
 
 
Realistic group conflict theory 
Realistic group conflict theory was based on the notion that intergroup hostility had its basis 
in the fundamental struggle for survival where groups compete with one another for scarce 
resources (Sumner, 1906).  According to this theory, when groups are involved in interaction 
with opposing interests, competition incites differing interests between them. This results in 
the development of conflict. This theory posits that hostility towards the outgroup is what 
generates ingroup identification and positive attachment to the ingroup. Thus social 
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conditions resulting in competition, threat and conflict between groups, are the contexts in 
which outgroup hostility and subsequent ingroup bias is produced (Levine & Campbell, 
1972 as cited in Hammond & Axelrod, 2006). 
 
 
Evidence for correlates with ingroup bias 
The ‘Robbers Cave Experiment’ first conducted in 1953 and fully implemented in 1961, 
 
supported the above theory by investigating the effect of intergroup conflict and 
cooperation on intergroup relations (Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, 
& Sherif, 1961). Boys attending a summer camp were assigned to two groups based on 
their commonalities and the groups were formed in isolation from one another. Thereafter 
the boys were engaged in activities within their own groups. After establishing a sense of 
group belonging over a few days, both groups then interacted with one another in a series 
of activities which either necessitated competition or co-operation between the groups 
(Sherif & Sherif, 1953). When the groups competed against one another for a scarce 
resource, where there was conflict over which group would win, anti-outgroup attitudes 
and behaviours were expressed. However, when participating with each other for mutual 
benefit little difference in the attitudes of, and behaviour towards, both ingroup and 
outgroup members was found (Sherif & Sherif, 1953). 
 
 
Sherif and Sherif (1953) stated that intergroup discrimination and enhanced ingroup 
affiliation occurred as a consequence of the conflict arising out of the competitive 
conditions of the interaction. They argued that group categorizations created a sense of 
group identification for the boys which became intrinsic to their “psychological makeup” 
(Sherif & Sherif, 1953, p. 2). This caused them to act in ways that were similar to their 
group members, thus resulting in ingroup bias (Sherif & Sherif, 1953, p. 188). Since the 
“…reactions of the individual members take place within reference frames, to which both 
internal and external factors contribute in a functionally interrelated fashion”, these studies 
showed how the conflict of interest between groups occurred in the context of a developing 
social interaction (Sherif & Sherif, 1953, p. 288). Instead of an individuals’ psychological 
makeup being the main determinants of ingroup bias, this behaviour was now considered as 
a product of the conditions in social settings (Sherif & Sherif, 1953). 
 
 
To answer the question about whether conflict and competition between groups are 
necessary conditions for ingroup bias Ferguson and Kelley (1964) explained to the groups 
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in their study, that the tasks they were to complete, did not involve any competition 
between the groups. After completing their tasks, participants were asked to rate the 
products made by both groups. Their results showed that even under non-competitive 
conditions, participants, both active and non-active group members, attributed a higher 
value to the products made by their own group and a lower value to those made by the 
outgroup (Ferguson & Kelley, 1964). 
 
 
Similar results were reported by Rabbie and Wilkens (1971). In their study, participants 
were divided into groups and were informed to either expect further interaction with or 
without outgroup members, or to expect no further interaction at all. Participants were 
asked to rate both the ingroup and outgroup on six evaluative traits prior to and after the 
interaction. All participants’ ratings were biased in favour of ingroups, in spite of 
expecting or not expecting future interaction with outgroup members. Interestingly, ratings 
after the interaction indicated a significant increase in bias towards the ingroup for 
interactions that were both competitive and non-competitive. It was reported that “the 
effect of actual intragroup interaction was to enhance bias toward ingroup members, but 
equally so for competitive and independent groups” (Brewer, 1979, p. 313). 
 
 
In light of the above it was further explored whether bias shown towards ingroups could 
occur 1) under conditions where individuals did not accrue personal benefit from favouring 
their ingroups, 2) where there was no competition between the groups and 3) where there 
was no previously hostility between the groups (Brown, 1988). These questions were 
examined in what was to become seminal research on intergroup relations. 
 
 
The minimal group studies and their legacy 
In this section of the argument, the original minimal group study is outlined. Thereafter I 
discuss the manner in which the social norm explanation was equivocated with an 
explanation rooted in the psychological need for a positive identity. I will then argue that 
regardless of the legacy of the MGP and popularity of social identity theory, there are 
methodological problems with the original study. These issues therefore perpetuate 
individualistically based explanations of ingroup bias. To address these concerns, a new 





The minimal group study 
Henri Tajfel was critical of individualistic theories of intergroup behaviour derived from 
experimental methods. He stated that “Many of the ‘individual’ theories start from the 
general descriptions of psychological processes which are assumed to operate in individuals 
in a way which is independent of the effects of social interaction and social context” (Tajfel, 
1978 as cited in Milner, 1981 p. 107). Thus, the object of study for Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and 
Flament (1971) was on how the norms and values that are relevant to a particular context, 
guide human action. 
 
 
Since intergroup discrimination occurred in the absence of group conflict (Ferguson & 
Kelley, 1964; Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971; Tajfel, 1970), the minimal group study (Tajfel, 
1970) examined the lower levels of what was necessary to cause ingroup bias. All socially 
related references that could result in ingroup bias or outgroup discrimination were removed 
from the experimental context. This was done in order to isolate the effects of social 
categorization that could be causally related to ingroup bias. Thus the experimental 
conditions in the MGP included 1) no face to face interaction between the participants even 
after being categorized into a group, 2) anonymity of group membership, 3) no link between 
the criteria for group categorization and the allocation tasks, 4) “the allocation responses 
having no utilitarian value to the participant making them, 5) responding in terms of intergroup 
differentiation should be in competition with a strategy based on other more “rational” and 
“utilitarian” principles, and 6) the response should be made as important as possible to the participant 
and should consist of real decisions (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 197, p. 154). Since 
conditions of the interaction were asocial, group belonging was limited to a cognitive 
conception thereby constituting a minimal group (Tajfel et al., 1971).  
 
 
Participants were presented with a random cluster of dots and were asked to estimate the 
number of dots in each cluster. Thereafter they were asked to partake in another study on 
judgments. Participants were randomly assigned to an arbitrary group but were told that 
their group designation was based on their performance on the dot estimation task. They 
then proceeded to a cubicle, were given an allocation booklet and asked to allocate a once 
off monetary reward or penalty between an ingroup and outgroup member. Each choice 
was made on carefully constructed matrices that were randomized in each booklet. When 
making the allocations, participants were isolated from their groups, the rewards and 
penalties were anonymously allocated and recipients could only be identified by their 
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group membership. Those who received the reward or penalty were not aware of the 
allocations they received and the groups did not interact with one another (Tajfel et al., 
1971). The results showed that a large majority of participants allocated more rewards to 
ingroup members than outgroups, when the groups were distinguished from one another as 
opposed to distributing the rewards fairly when there was no intergroup differentiation. It 
was concluded that “The only thing we needed to do to achieve this result was to associate 
their judgments of numbers of dots with the use of the terms “your group” and “the other 
group” in the instructions and on the booklets of matrices” (Tajfel, 1970, p. 101). The 
results indicated that even under minimal conditions, participants displayed ingroup bias 
due to the effects of being categorized into a group. 
 
 
These consistent and significant results were explored further in a modified version of 
this study, conducted in 1971. Instead of the dot estimation task delineating group 
membership, participants indicated whether they preferred images of paintings by artists 
Klee or Kandinsky. Participants were told that their artistic preferences determined how 
they were assigned to groups, but they were randomly assigned.  Thereafter, they 
completed the allocation task in the same minimal experimental conditions as the 
aforementioned study. The matrices that were used are displayed in Figure 1. 































(Tajfel et al., 1971, p. 164) 
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Each matrix contained 13 terms and comprised of two rows of values, e.g. 
19
1
 . Participants 
could either choose one term, where the values on the top and bottom rows were allocated to 
an ingroup or outgroup member, depending on the type of choice (i.e. between two ingroup 
members between two outgroup members or between an ingroup and outgroup member). The 
matrices were designed to show the decision strategies used by participants such as 
 
 
 maximum joint profit: where the maximum points for both ingroup and outgroup 
were chosen 
 maximum ingroup profit: the maximum amount of points were awarded to the 
ingroup regardless of the amount designated for outgroups 
 maximum differentiation: allocations that maximize the differentiation 
between groups where ingroups receive more allocations than outgroups. 




In type A matrices, when the top row designated outgroup allocations, the decision 
strategies of maximum joint profit, maximum ingroup profit and maximum difference in 
favour of the ingroup, were located on the extreme right of the matrix. When the top row 
designated ingroup allocations, maximum joint profit and maximum difference in favour of 
the ingroup were located on the extreme left while maximum joint profit remained on the 
right. Type B matrices were structured such that when the top row designated allocations to 
outgroup members, maximum joint profit, maximum ingroup profit and maximum 
difference in favour of the ingroup, were located on the extreme right of the matrix. When 
the top row designated ingroup allocations, maximum joint profit and maximum ingroup 
profit were located on the right and maximum difference in favour of the ingroup located 
on the extreme left (Tajfel et al., 1971). 
 
 
The results demonstrated that the strategy of maximum joint payoff (i.e. the maximum 
joint amount for both ingroups and outgroups) barely affected the allocations made. 
Maximum ingroup profit (i.e. the largest possible amount awarded to the ingroup) was 
important but was outweighed by maximum difference (i.e. largest possible difference in 
gain between a member of the ingroup and a member of the outgroup, in favour of the 
ingroup). Differentiating between the ingroup and outgroup was therefore more important 
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than awarding the maximum joint amount to both groups. The major conclusions drawn 
from this study included: 1) allocation strategies of ingroup favouritism and fairness were 
predominantly used, 2) outgroup discrimination occurred in the absence of intergroup 
hostility, and 3) the act of categorization was sufficient to cause differential behaviour 
towards ingroups and outgroups. In his concluding remarks Tajfel (1970) noted that 
 
the generic norm of outgroup behaviour to which I have referred does exist and that 
it helps to distort what might have been more reasonable conduct. This norm 
determines behaviour- as other social norms do- when an individual finds himself in 
a situation to which, in his view, the norm applies… To behave socially is a 
complex business. It involves a long learning process; it is based on the 
manipulation of symbols and abstractions; it implies the capacity for modification of 
conduct when the situation changes-and social situations never remain static. To 
behave appropriately is therefore a powerful social motive, and attempting to do so 
means to behave according to one best understanding of the situation.  
(Tajfel, 1970, p. 102). 
 
In this view, ingroup bias occurred as a result of the categorization process and the 
norm of ingroup bias that participants employed in their behaviour. This is because 
 
social conduct is to a very large extent determined by what an individual deems to 
be appropriate to the social situation in which he finds himself. His conceptions of 
what is appropriate are in turn determined by the prevailing system of norms and 
values which must be analyzed in the light of the properties of the social system in 
which he lives. (Tajfel, 1972, p.100) 
 
 
These studies demonstrated how in an asocial, undifferentiated context, where participants’ 
personal interests were not directly related to their actions and where it was possible to 
maximize the total benefit for all participants, behaviour was based on an ad hoc group 
categorization. The results were interpreted “in terms of the functioning of a ‘generic’ social 
norm which was perceived by the Ss as relevant to the solution of a problem of social 
conduct with which they were confronted” (Tajfel et al., 1971, p. 176). It was therefore 
posited that, as a result of being categorized in to groups, participants drew on the 
expectations of normative social conduct, (in this case differentiating between the ingroup 
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and outgroup and acting in ways that favoured the ingroup over the outgroup) to cope with 
the demands of their context. However, this explanation was later revised. 
 
The move from a social norm explanation to social identity theory 
A crucial theoretical shift occurred which was informed by a replication study conducted by 
 
Billig and Tajfel (1973). They explored the effect of similarity based social 
categorizations on intergroup behaviour. They argued that since social categorization 
and similarities between ingroup members were not experimentally isolated, the effect of 
social categorization on intergroup behaviour could not be properly examined in the 
original study. Thus this replication study was designed to isolate social categorization 
and similarity between ingroup members. The results demonstrated significant ingroup 
bias in how the rewards and penalties were allocated, despite participants knowing that 
their group distinctions were based on arbitrary criteria. 
 
 
As a result, Billig and Tajfel (1973) questioned whether the term ‘group’ could have 
provoked a normative pattern of behaviour where participants favoured their ingroup. 
They stated that the group category failed to account for broader sociopsychological 
factors and suggested that group categorization “can be made to explain almost 
everything, and therefore they explain very little if anything at all” (Billing & Tajfel, 
1973, p. 49). Instead, they focussed on how one defines their own identity in terms of 
their particular social categorization. Based on the argument that one’s group 
contributes to the positive aspect of a person’s image if the group is positively 
differentiated from other groups on value laden critieria, they suggested that ingroup 
bias served to differentiate the groups from one another. These “tentative explorations” 
(Billig & Tajfel, 1973, p. 50) were later formalized as Social Identity Theory (SIT). 
 
 
This theory proposes that during categorization, individuals view themselves similarly to 
their group members and different from those who belonged to other groups. They act in 
ways that exaggerate the differences between groups and minimize the differences within 
them in order to maintain an acceptable and meaningful self-concept. This is because 
individuals define themselves according to both their individual and group identities. Thus 
when group membership is salient, individuals strive for their groups to be positively 
distinctive from others, because of its positive implications on their identity. Hence, the 
more individuals identify with their ingroups the more they act in ways where they show 
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preference for and favour their own groups over outgroups. This is because of the 
individual’s aim to enhance their own and group members’ self-esteem to achieve a 
positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
 
In accounts for why the norm theory was no longer sufficient, Brown, Tajfel and Turner 
(1980) stated that initially the generic norm explanation seemed viable due to intergroup 
discrimination being “so pervasive in our societies that it ‘spilled over’ even to the highly 
artificial and restricted situations which we were using in our experiments” (Brown, Tajfel 
& Turner, 1980, p. 410). But, it was insufficient as “it tended towards circularity and was 
unheuristic” (Brown et al., 1980, p. 410). In addition, Turner (1980, as cited in Brown et 
al., 1980, p. 410) was of the opinion that a normative account “fails to offer a useful 
account of psychological processes”. In addition, difficulty with specifying the norm that 
resulted in ingroup bias was raised by Hertel and Kerr (2001). Normative explanations of 
ingroup bias were thus supplanted with individuals’ psychological quest for self-esteem 
(Condor, 2003) and the explanation of ingroup bias was thus reverted to the individual and 
psychological level once more. 
 
The popularity of social identity theory and individualistic accounts 
of ingroup bias 
Numerous replications of the MGP have confirmed that categorization incites individuals’ 
 
inherent desire for positive social identity. Categorization is therefore a sufficient condition 
for ingroup favoritism to be manifest (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Turner, 1975, as cited in 
Brewer & Silver, 1978; Doise & Sinclair, 1972; Brewer, 1979; Diehl, 1990). The 
supporting evidence suggests that group norms do not cause individuals to favour their 
ingroups, but rather it is the effects of categorization at the individual level which result in 
ingroup favouritism. These explanations have been most popular and SIT is a key 




However as Spears, Jetten and Doosje (2001) assert “there is no natural or universal 
condition of either ingroup or outgroup bias independent of social circumstances” (pp. 333-
334). Supporting evidence from Brewer and Campbell (1976, as cited in Brewer, 2007) 
found that those ethnic outgroups who were viewed as having more resources and status, in 
terms of achievement and status related traits, were rated more favourably compared to 
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ingroups. In addition, Noel, Wann and Branscombe (1995) reported that more negative 
judgment of outgroups were displayed in the presence of central ingroup members, as 
opposed to less negative judgment of outgroups in the absence of other ingroup members. 
These findings highlight the importance of the context and conditions of interaction since 
“derogation of comparison outgroups can sometimes be a mere public display and is not 
necessarily accompanied by privately held negative attitudes toward the outgroup” (Noel, 
Wann & Branscombe, 1995, p. 136). 
 
 
While there have been attempts to explain outgroup bias using SIT, in terms of the 
social context which legitimates its expression, the ideological content of group norms 
evident in naturally occurring groups could not be addressed in the MGP (Spears, Jetten 
& Doosje, 2001). Thus, it is argued that this approach is not sufficient to explain the 
instances where there are different norms for how outgroups are treated as “Sometimes 
there is socially shared bigotry; sometimes there is not; sometimes an ideology of 
tolerance might be widespread” (Billig, 2002, p.178). Billig refers to Tajfel (1981, as 
cited in Billig, 2002, p. 174) who alludes to the problem “that all men can and do 
display hostility towards groups other their own...there is also no doubt, however, that 
under other conditions this hostility either does not appear or can be modified”. Other 
evidence also suggests that the degree of identification and whether outgroup 
favouritism is considered and accepted as a legitimate practice, impacts upon whether 
ingroup bias is manifest or not. This is because “social reality” constrains the expression 
of ingroup bias and discrimination” (Spears, Jetten & Doosje, 2001, p. 352). This theory 
is therefore limited in its ability to account for how ingroup bias is dependent on the 
context for its expression. Furthermore, there are problems with the foundation on which 
this theory was developed. 
 
Critique of the original minimal group study 
In this section I will describe two important critiques of the MGP namely, the too minimal 
 
nature of the groups and the methodological problem of the matrices. I argue that the 
groups in the MGP were too minimal as they lacked any sort of realism. This is because, 
the essential social and interactive context necessary for the study of intergroup relations 
was not available in the original study. I then argue that, in addition to the self-esteem 
explanation offered by SIT, the structure of the matrices makes an experimental artefact 




The theoretical relevance of the MGP findings is the “strong and consistent evidence of 
intergroup differentiation without involving the forms of interdependence that were 
previously thought to be essential for such phenomena to occur” (Reicher, Spears, & 
Postmes, 1995, p. 184). These results showed that ingroup bias was still manifest even in 
contexts where 1) group categorizations were random, 2) the groups had no history or 
future interactions, 3) there was no personal interest for group members, and 4) no 
interaction between fellow group members. Thus, the value of the minimal social context 
is indeed recognised as “these very features that supposedly render the context minimal 
actually provide its psychological power” (Reicher et al., 1995, p. 184). 
 
 
However, since it is in intergroup interaction that ingroup bias is manifest, 
Aschenbrenner and Schaefer (1980) question whether ingroup bias is actually based on 
the aforementioned psychological determinants of self-esteem. This is because social 
interaction between the participants was absent in the original study. Brown (1988) 
confirmed this by highlighting 
 
how sparse this social setting really was. The children were allocated to two 
meaningless groups on a flimsy criterion. They did not interact with members of 
their own or the other group. The two groups had no current or past relationship 
with other. (Brown, 1988, p. 224) 
 
In addition, Bornewasser and Bober (1987) also argued that the minimal context did 
not account for the structure of the group. They considered the consequences that 
 
intergroup behavior as an interaction in terms of the actor’s group identification is 
confined to the subject’s reference to a similarity criterion…Thus, when carrying 
out experiments in the minimal group paradigm one has to be aware of a 
discrepancy between theoretical intention and empirical studies actually done. 
(Bornewasser & Bober, 1987, p. 273) 
 
 
What this means is that there is a discrepancy between the conceptualization of ingroup 
bias and the manner in which it was operationalized. Ingroup bias is essentially a social 
and interactional feature of social life, but it was studied according to an asocial approach. 
Participants were isolated when they completed the distribution task and there was no 
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interaction between them. It is therefore argued that the lack of interaction made the 
context so minimal that it lost essential features of ‘groupness’ i.e. how groups interact 
with one another in the real world. 
 
 
Furthermore, the methodology was “limited in its ability to illuminate diachronic 
processes, especially processes taking place over a long period of time” (Tajfel, 1972, 
as cited in Condor, 1996, p. 292) as the distributions were made on a once-off basis. 
This limitation represents a “weakness of much experimental research on intergroup 
relations is… its neglect of the dimension of time” (Spears, Jetten & Doosje, 2001, p. 
352) and is problematic because “one cannot exhibit favouritism through a single 
judgment, but only through a pattern across several separate judgments” (Hertel & 
Kerr, 2001, p. 320). The basis for this lies in the fact that most behaviour of individuals 
in a group is not a once off act. Rather, it is a process that requires thought and is 
shaped by the individual actor, others, the context and the norms which arise out of a 
particular situation since 
 
We need to see group forces arising out of the actions of individuals and 
individuals whose actions are a function of the group forces that they themselves 
(or others) have brought into existence. We must see group phenomena as both the 




Therefore, the interactions between individuals in a specific context evolve and are 
modified since the social world and our participation in it, is constituted by the “serial 
linking of events, and the serial transmission of action and information between social 
actors and local domains” (Condor, 1996, p. 291). Since these key features of social life 
were not attended to, the possibility for a social explanation of ingroup bias was therefore 
lost in the design of the minimal group studies. As a result, social reality (according to 
the MGP) could never be extended beyond a “fixed and external “given”” (Spears, Jetten 
& Doosje, 2001, p. 353). Consequently, ingroup bias was attributed to a state of ‘being’ 
that is universal, inevitable and unchangeable (Spears, Jetten & Doosje, 2001). 
 
 
However, explaining ingroup bias in terms of “individually ascertained properties” is 
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conceptually reductive and insufficient as ingroup bias is neither fixed nor only the result of 
individual or psychological phenomena (Bornewasser & Bober, 1987, p. 268). Instead, 
individual, situational, relational and temporal factors are implicated in whether it is 
expressed or not, since ingroup bias likely to be “waxing-and-waning” in different contexts 
(Billig, 2002, p. 174). As Condor (1996) argues, social life and the relations between 
individuals ought to be understood as social processes that are negotiated and fluctuate as 
they are constituted over time, between and within groups. The exclusion of the temporal 
element of social interaction and social interaction itself therefore screened off ingroup bias 
as a “process of “becoming””, constituted in interaction and dependent on the 
circumstances for its expression (Spears, Jetten & Doosje, 2001, p. 352).  The BBC prison 
study conducted by Reicher and Haslam (2006, as cited in Drury & Reicher, 2009) 
illustrated the importance of including a temporal component to the study of intergroup 
phenomena as 
 
it extended over 10 days and hence it was possible to investigate interactive 
dynamics which produced collective action. On the one hand it was possible to see 
how participants sought to define the meaning of events, the nature of groups and 
relations between groups, and how this affected what they did. On the other hand, 
one could analyze the way in which the actions of one group framed the responses of 
the other which in turn impacted back on the first group. This is in stark contrast to 
the increasing tendency of laboratory experiments to neglect both the ways in which 
categories are constructed and contested and also to neglect interaction.  
(Drury & Reicher, 2009, p. 711) 
 
As a result of this neglect, the methodology of the MGP made 1) the universal psychological 
SIT explanation of ingroup bias seem plausible, and 2) it difficult to study the effect of norms 




Aschenbrenner and Schaefer (1980) argued for the possibility that participants made the 
 
choices they did because they were inclined to extreme scoring. According to this 
view, participants would repeatedly choose the extreme decision strategies because of 
their locations on the matrices, as seen in Figure 1. It is also likely that participants 
acted according to demand characteristics and social desirability expectations because 
of the structure of the matrices (Aschenbrenner & Schaefer, 1980). 
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Figure 2 illustrates how each matrix differentiated the ingroup from the outgroup. Perhaps 
this arrangement set up the groups as different and in opposition to one another  as “the 
response dimension of the reward matrices also forces subjects to respond in group terms 
if they are to make sense of an otherwise meaningless task” (Reicher et al., 1995, pp. 184-
185). Moreover, participants were verbally instructed to allocate rewards or penalties to a 
member of either the Klee or Kandinsky group, further differentiating the ingroup and the 
outgroup. The group significations could have consequently made participants more 
attuned to group differences, resulting in their interpreting the purpose of the experiment 
as such.  
 
 
This thesis therefore proposes that the features of the matrices ensured that participants 
favour their ingroup over the outgroup, as the MGP “allowed for little other than this 
group-based response” (Spears et al., 2001, p. 336). This is because the matrices were 
constructed in way where the only means to attain positive group distinctiveness would be 
to show bias towards ones ingroup. It seems that the ingroup versus outgroup choices 
delineated by the matrices were therefore set up to achieve to the desired results. 
Consequently, it is possible that individuals favoured their ingroups not only because of 
their psychological quest for self- esteem, but also because of the experimental artefact 
inherent in how the matrices were structured (Aschenbrenner & Schaefer, 1980). 
 
 
The impact of intra- and intergroup interactions on ingroup bias in the 
minimal group paradigm 
The “properties of groups and the consequences of membership for individuals” were not 
addressed in the original study because 1) social interaction between groups, 2) how 
interaction creates connections between individuals and 3) how the interaction develops 
and is produced over time, were absent (Sherif 1966, as cited in Tajfel, 1978b, p. 436). 
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Therefore, this thesis introduces a new method for studying ingroup bias in the MGP that 
enables 1) social interaction between participants, 2) a temporal element of the interaction 
and 3) the behaviours of participants to be visible to all in the interaction. 
 
 
The methodological strength of this novel interactive minimal group environment, is that 
participants are not required to make a between group allocation compared to the original 
study. Here, participants are at liberty to choose to whom they allocate tokens. Furthermore, 
by enabling a context for developing social interaction that is visible to those within the 
interaction, this method provides the platform to extend the universal and psychologically 
based explanation of ingroup bias. This thesis proposes that it is not only cognitive schemas 
which inform how one acts but also the norms that emerge in interaction in a specific 
context. This is because the ideologies of a particular context inform how groups perceive 
one another which impacts upon their subsequent relations (Billig, 2002, p. 174). Therefore 
VIAPPL allows the study of the effect of norms as the interaction unfolds over time 
because the interaction is rendered visible. Such a technology surpasses the need for a post-
hoc imputation of a normative explanation and allows for an emergent explanation that 




Research aims, rationale, questions and hypotheses 
The rationale for this thesis is twofold. The original minimal group study neglected the 
fundamental features of how social interaction unfolds over time and the methodology was 
critiqued for setting up the experiment in a way that ensured the desired results. The main 
aim of this research was to therefore revisit Tajfel’s original minimal group study using a 
new technology which overcomes the problems of neglecting social interaction and the 
temporal features of interaction, as well as requiring a between group allocation. 
 
 
The overall research question is: “Under what conditions of interaction is ingroup bias most 
likely to be manifest?” There are two hypotheses of this research which are outlined in 
Table 1. In terms of the minimal group hypothesis, it is expected that ingroup bias is more 
likely to be manifest when individuals interact with one another as members of a group than 
when they have no group membership. With regards to the second temporal hypothesis, it is 
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expected that when interacting as group member, individuals demonstrate ingroup bias but 
this behaviour is amplified as the interaction unfolds over time. 
 






H0: There is no difference in ingroup bias between the 
 
individual condition and the minimal group condition  
 
 
H1: Ingroup bias is greater in the minimal group than 




H0: There are no differences in ingroup bias between 
 




H1: Ingroup bias is significantly greater in Trial 3  than 
 
Trial 1 of the minimal group condition 
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Chapter three: Methodology 
 
Method: Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL) 
VIAPPL is the new method that was employed to study interaction. Abstracted to a virtual 
 
environment where situational variables are manipulated, the VIAPPL platform allows for 
the observable and measurable study of social life that was previously not possible 
(Durrheim & Quayle, 2012). VIAPPL is an experimental software programme and 
simulates a game like environment which renders visible the interactions between 
individuals as they emerge and change in real time. This novel context for social 
interaction is the ‘Give and Get’ game. 
 
 
The ‘Give and Get’ game 
As each participant logs in to the game they are presented with a screen where all 
participants are represented as small circles, as seen in Figure 3.  
 


























Note. Each circle represents a player in the game. Although the players interact with one another the 
actual identity of the group members is unknown. This screen shot shows the participant (purple dot 
with black outline, and different circles are outlined at each workstation); one ingroup member 
(purple dot) and two outgroup members (yellow dots). Each player is allocated a set number of 
tokens and may distribute these in anyway (i.e. to the ingroup or the outgroup). Thus the ingroup token 
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balance could change if the outgroup as well as other ingroup members allocated their tokens to the 
ingroup. These tokens are exchanged between participants in real time. Players can receive tokens, 
give away tokens and take back tokens to redistribute. This particular condition is assessing the 
participants tendency to favour the ingroup and discriminate against the outgroup.  
 
 
There are a maximum of 14 players per game and participants are required to allocate tokens 
to other players of their choice. Figure 4 displays a token exchange between two participants.  
 





























Note. This screen shot represents the connection that forms between players that allocate 
tokens to each other. 
 
The game includes both an “individual” and “group” condition. In the “individual” 















Note. There is no group categorization in this condition of the game. Players act as 
individuals as they have no group membership. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 display the “group” condition where participants are allocated to one of two 
groups, and is represented by the colour of their circle. Figure 6 indicates the preference task 

















Figure 6. Preference task 
 
 
Note. In order to create a sense of group membership participants were asked to indicate their 
preferred painting in the preference task. Participants thought that they were allocating themselves 
into a group but in fact were randomly allocated to one of two groups. Random allocation was 
achieved by pre-defining the groups in the VIAPPL arena editor software where each circle was 
allocated to one of the two groups before the start of each game. This information was stored in the 
database and could not be deduced by participants.  
 
 
There are two types of ‘Give and Get’ games. Each game consists of three trials where 
group membership is either masked or visible in the individual and group conditions, 
respectively. This manipulation occurs in a specific sequence which is unique to the type of 
game. Table 2 indicates the two types of games, namely IGI and GIG, each consisting of 













Table 2. Two types of ‘Give and Get’ games 
 
Type of game: IGI 
Trial one Individual condition 
Trial two Group condition 
Trial three Individual condition 
  
Type of game: GIG 
Trial one Group condition 
Trial two Individual condition 




There are 15 rounds nested within each trial of the game. These rounds provide participants 
the opportunity to allocate a token to others as well as facilitating the temporal component 
of the interaction.  
 
 
There are two additional experimental constants included in the design namely 
 
 token balances (hereafter referred to as balance) which displays the number of 
tokens players accrue in each round. These balances are shown in Figure 3. They 
are located alongside each participant as well as on the left of the screen. When 
visible, participants are able to see their own and other players’ balances as well as 
the changes of these balances as the game advances.  
 ties between players (hereafter referred to as ties) form as a result of token 
exchanges between players. Figure 7 displays the ties and shows the connections 

















Note. This screen is presented to players after each round. It indicates how the tokens were 
distributed in the last round and provides an update of participants’ token balances. By 
displaying this information to participants as the interaction is occurring, VIAPPL renders the 
developing interaction visible. 
 
Token balance and ties between players can either be visible and or masked in both 
individual and group conditions. When visible, balance is displayed on the screen and ties 
are indicated after each round of the trial. When masked, balance is absent and the ties are 
not displayed after each round of the game. 
 
 
The minimal ‘Give and Get’ context 
The nature of game is such that it is an undifferentiated context with no competitive 
conditions between the groups or individual players. Individuals allocate tokens to one 
another but are not required to make a between group allocation. They are at liberty to 
decide to whom they allocate their tokens. There is no previous hostility between the groups 
or individual players. The ‘Give and Get’ game allows players to observe the actions of 
others, when ties and balance are visible. Furthermore, token allocations over the rounds of 
each trial enable the study of the temporal features of interaction. VIAPPL therefore 
facilitates a context of social interaction occurring over time and is indicative of intergroup 
46 
 
interaction in real life in this respect (Durrheim & Quayle, 2012, p. 1). The visibility and 
temporal features of the VIAPPL platform allows the study of 1) social interaction between 
groups, 2) how interaction creates connections between individuals, and 3) how the 




A within-subjects and between-groups experimental research design was employed. Time, the 
within-subjects factor was comprised of three levels (i.e. Trial 1, Trial 2, and Trial 3). Group 
visibility was the between-groups factor and comprised of two levels. The first level is 
referred to as ‘GIG’ and the second as ‘IGI’, where “G” denotes the minimal group condition 
where group membership is visible and “I” denotes the individual condition where group 
membership is masked. Table 3 displays both the within-subjects factors and between-groups 
factors. 
 




 Within-subjects Factor- Time 





G I G 
I G I 
 Note. The number of participants in each trial was kept constant.  
  
 
The independent variable (IV) 
The IV is the group condition (G) and the individual condition (I). 
 
 
The dependent variable (DV) 
An ingroup bias index was measured in terms of ingroup giving and ingroup receiving. 
 
 Ingroup giving was calculated by the ratio of the number of tokens given to 
the ingroup, to the number of tokens given to the outgroup. 
 Ingroup receiving was calculated by the ratio of the number of tokens received 
from the ingroup to the number of tokens received from the outgroup. 
The ingroup bias index is a combined measure of these ratios. It was calculated by 
dividing ingroup giving by ingroup receiving. It was operationalized as the measure of 
the degree to which there is more ingroup favouritism in giving than outgroup 
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favouritism in receiving (Durrheim & Quayle, 2012).  
 
 
Two research studies 
Two different studies were conducted for this thesis. Both were based on the same research 
 
design but differed in terms of the conditions of the additional experimental constants, 
i.e. balances and ties. In Study 1, ties between players were masked, but balance was 




Non-probability sampling was used as generalization was not the main aim of this 
 
investigation. The total sample comprised 248 UKZN undergraduate students of both 




Ethical issues in sampling 
UKZN students were invited to participate in the study (see Appendix A). Participants were 
 
given an information sheet and they signed an informed consent document providing 
agreement to their participation (see Appendix B). These documents stated that participants 
were free to withdraw from the study at any time and that their participation was voluntary. 
Participants’ personal records were not required for the study. Participants’ were over 18 
years of age. They were not mentally or legally incompetent. There were neither language 
barriers nor factors of the study that increased participants’ vulnerability or susceptibility to 
harm. The only cost to participants was a loss of their time, which was compensated for by 
a twenty rand cash incentive. Participants signed a form confirming receipt of the incentive 
after their participation (see Appendix C). The research gained from the study did not 
benefit participants personally but they did receive a direct monetary benefit. 
 
 
The research was conducted in the PsycLab (Psychology Computer Laboratory) since it is 
equipped with computer facilities to accommodate the number of participants required for 
each experiment. Low risk deception was used in the study. Participants were told that their 
group allocation was based on their preference between two paintings. However, they were 
randomly assigned to a group. This form of low risk deception was warranted, as the 
research explores the effects of group membership on individuals’ behaviour. Participants 
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were debriefed after the experiment to manage the deception. 
 
 
Ethical issues in data collection 
Ethical approval was granted for this research study (see Appendix D). There was no need 
for a registered professional to carry out the procedure. Participants had to provide their 
student numbers and email addresses when logging into the game. Confidentiality of this 
information was maintained, as participants’ responses were not associated with their 
identifying details provided during the registration. Participants remained entirely 
anonymous and their participation confidential. The data were electronically stored, 
indefinitely in the VIAPPL database for further research purposes. Permission for the further 




The VIAPPL software recorded and saved each token allocation that was made per round of 
 
the game. Details of the sender and receiver were recorded in terms of their group 
membership and whether they received or allocated the token. Quantitative, ratio data was 
produced. The VIAPPL platform summarised both the data produced for each trial and for 
each round for a game. Since participants’ token allocations were repeated over the three 
trials of the game, a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the 
trial data. The trial data was imported into the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) and organised in a multivariate format. This method of analysis facilitated the 
comparison of ingroup bias in terms of the two group design, i.e. between the IGI and GIG 
experiments. 
 
In addition, social network analysis (SNA) methods were employed for further analysis of 
the data in Study 2. This method allowed for the study of the evolution of the repeated token 
allocations over time. The unit of analysis in SNA is the relation between interacting entit ies 
and includes the exchanges between participants in the ‘Give and Get’ game. This method 
was therefore appropriate as it relied less on averages and revealed the patterns of 




Chapter four: Results 
This chapter presents the results from the repeated measures ANOVA.  
 
 
Repeated measures ANOVA 
 
Study 1 
Study 1 compared the effects of ingroup bias between the individual condition and the 
minimal group condition over the three trials of the game. The IV is group visibility, i.e. 
the individual condition (where players act with no group membership, i.e. as an 
individual) and the minimal group condition (where players act in terms of their group 
membership, i.e. as a group member). The DV is a measure of the degree to which there is 
more ingroup favouritism in giving than outgroup favouritism in receiving, where higher 
scores indicate a high degree of ingroup bias being manifest. The DV was also calculated 
for the individual condition for comparative purposes. Participants were randomly 
assigned in the individual condition. Their group assignment was masked yet still recorded 
in the on the VIAPPL database.  
 
 
The experimental conditions of the game were such that 
 
 token balances for both individual and group conditions, were visible in all three 
trials of the game, and 
 the ties between players were masked in all three trials of the game. 
 
 
This study addressed the minimal group and temporal hypotheses outlined in chapter two 
i.e. that: 
 ingroup bias is greater in the group condition than the individual 
condition, and  
 ingroup bias will be greater in trial three than trials one and two, in the 
minimal group condition 
 
It is expected that there will be a significant interaction effect between group visibility 
(IGI and GIG) and time (trial one, trial two and trial three) and that this effect is stronger 









Upon arrival, participants were greeted by the experimenter who was dressed in a white lab 
 
coat. Once all participants were seated, the information sheet was discussed and the consent 
forms were then signed and collected. The experimenter then assisted participants’ in 
creating an account and logging onto the system. Brief instructions were provided to 
participants. All participants were presented with the same type of game (i.e. IGI or GIG 
sequence) in a single experimental setting. Table 4 indicates the number of experimental 
settings of each condition. Participants then followed the screen prompt asking them to 
indicate their preferred Klee or Kandinsky painting and were told that their group allocation 
would be based on their preferences. However, participants were randomly assigned. 
Thereafter the experimenter explained how the program operates by using the first round of 
the game as an exemplar. On completion of the experiment participants were thanked for 





57 participants were included in this study. The total number of participants in the 
IGI experiment was 24 and there were 33 participants in the GIG experiment. 
Participants were randomly allocated to the IGI and GIG conditions. A further 
breakdown of the sample is outlined in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Sample: Study 1 
 
Experiment IGI GIG 













Note. No. of replications refer to the number of times the same experiment was conducted. So, the IGI 






A mixed within-subjects and between-groups repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. 
 
There is one between-groups factor (with two levels: individual, and group) and one 




To manage the violation of independence of observations a general linear model was used 
for this repeated measures analysis, as it accounted for the dependence of observations. 
Levene’s test of equality of error variances was used to assess the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance. Table 5 displays the results. 
 











































It is evident that homogeneity of variance was violated in Trial 1, F(1,55) = 8.822, p = 
 
0.004 and Trial 2, F(1, 55) = 18.358, p = 0.000 but not in Trial 3, F(1, 55) = 1.001, p = 
 
0.321. To account for the violations the first two trials, Box’s method of comparing Fobtained 
to Fα with altered degrees of freedom, was employed to adjust for the heterogeneity of 
variance (Box, 1954a, as cited in Howell, 2010). According to Howell (2010) if the 
comparison is significant: “then the means are significantly different regardless of the 
equality, or inequality, of variances” (p. 335), thus confirming the result. Since the 
assumption of sphericity was not violated, Mauchly’s W= 0.999, p = 0.974, the tests of 















Table 6. Descriptive statistics: Study 1 
IGI 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 
Mean 1.1536 2.9344 1.6675 
Standard 
deviation 
.70763 3.78127 2.31392 
N 24 24 24 
 
GIG 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 
   




3.74002 1.31628 3.41191 
N 33 33 33 
 
 
Figure 8. Quadratic trend: Study 1 
 
 
The scores represent the degree to which there is more ingroup favouritism in giving 
than outgroup favouritism in receiving. As group membership is not salient in the 
individual interaction condition, mean ingroup bias is 1.1536 at Trial 1. However, when 
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group membership is known, bias scores are increased by 1.1418 units to 2.2954 in the 
group interaction condition. At Trial 2, mean ingroup bias increases to 2.9344 in the 
minimal group interaction condition and decreases to a mean score of 1.3715 in the 
individual interaction condition. At Trial 3, the bias index is 1.6675 in the individual 
interaction condition and increases to 2.3510 in the minimal group interaction condition. 
Thus, mean bias scores are higher when group membership is salient as compared to 
mean bias scores when group membership is masked, over all three trials. The quadratic 
trend indicates that there is more ingroup favouritism in giving in the group conditions 
as more tokens are allocated to the ingroup than the outgroup. As group membership is 








As expected, the main effect for time was not significant, F = 0.319, df = 2, p = 0.728, η2 = 
 
0.006 and the main effect for group visibility was also not significant. F (1) = 0.041, p= 
 





The interaction effect (F = 3.514, df = 2, p = 0.033, η2 = 0.060) showed that the mean level 
of ingroup bias was significantly different across the three trials. These results were 
confirmed by Box’s comparison method.  Ingroup bias was shown to be greater in the 
minimal group condition than in the individual condition, and that there are differences in 
ingroup bias over the three trials of the game. Consequently, a significant quadratic trend 




Between-group and within-subjects planned contrasts tests assessed whether the 
differences in ingroup bias between the group and individual conditions at each trial were 
significant or not. The results revealed that these differences were not significant at Trial 1 
(t= 1.712, df= 35.109, p=0.096). They were marginally significant at Trial 2 (t= -1.941, df= 





However, results of the planned contrast for the GIG (between-groups factor) reveal that 
when group membership is salient, ingroup bias scores at Trial 1 and Trial 3 are not 
significantly different from one another (F = 0.004, df = 1, p = 0.949). As the increase 
in ingroup bias at Trial 3 is not significantly different from the lower score at Trial 1, 
there is no supporting evidence for the temporal hypothesis. The difference in ingroup 
bias between Trial 2 and Trial 3, when group membership was masked then made 
salient respectively, was also not significant (F= 2.316, df = 1, p = 0.138).  
 
 
Planned contrasts for the IGI (between-groups factor) indicate that there are no 
significant differences in ingroup bias at Trial 1 and Trial 3 (F = 1.220, df = 1, p = 
0.281). This result was expected since group membership was masked in both trials. 
The differences in ingroup bias between group membership being salient in Trial 2 and 




A mixed within-subjects and between-groups repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
test the minimal group and temporal hypotheses. These results support the minimal group 
hypothesis but not the temporal hypothesis. The results only demonstrated that ingroup bias 
was manifest to a greater degree in the minimal group condition than the individual 
condition. There was no evidence for ingroup bias amplifying as the interaction unfolded 
over time. It was noted that although the overall pattern of means was as expected, a high 
degree of variance was evident (see Table 6). In addition, the small sample size 





The power of this study was increased in two ways namely, by increasing the sample size 
and rendering visible the ties between players. It was hypothesized that the interaction effect 
would be stronger when ties between players were visible instead of masked as players 
would be able to observe how others behaved in the context. Thus the ties were presented to 




The IV and the DV remain the same. The former is group visibility, i.e. the individual 
interaction condition or group interaction condition. The latter is a measure of the degree 
to which there is more ingroup favouritism in giving than outgroup favouritism in 
receiving, where higher scores indicate a high degree of ingroup bias being manifest. The 
experimental conditions of the game were such that 
 token balances for both individual and group conditions, were visible in all three 
trials of the game, and 
 the ties between players were visible in all three trials of the game. 
 
 
This study addresses the same hypotheses, of significant differences in ingroup bias 
scores between the groups, over the trials of the game, as study one. In addition, it is also 






The size of the sample in this study was increased to 191 participants. There were 94 
participants in the IGI condition and 97 participants in the GIG condition. See table 7 for 
a further breakdown of the sample. 
 
Table 7: Sample: Study 2 
 
Experiment IGI GIG 





















The same method of analysis used in the first study was employed. A mixed within-subjects 
 
and between-groups repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. Once again, there is one 
between-groups factor (with two levels: individual, and group) and one within-subjects 




Levene’s test was used to assess the assumption of homogeneity of variance and the 













































The assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated across all three trials. In Trial 1   
F (1, 189) = 32.664, p = 0.000. In Trial 2, F (1,189) = 33.824, p = 0.000 and in Trial 3, F 
(1, 189) = 13.801, p = 0.000. Therefore, Box’s method was used to deal with the 
heterogeneity of variances. The assumption of sphericity was also violated, Mauchly’s W= 
0.899, p = 0.000 thus the multivariate tests output was interpreted. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are outlined below in Table 9 and the quadratic trend is displayed 











































Figure 9. Quadratic trend: Study 2 
 
 
Once again, the scores represent the degree to which there is more ingroup favouritism 
in giving than outgroup favouritism in receiving. At Trial 1, mean ingroup bias scores 
are 1.2383 in the individual interaction condition, and it increases to 2.1202 in the group 
IGI 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 
Mean 1.2383 2.1483 1.2622 
Standard 
deviation 
.95073 2.83180 1.06803 
N 94 94 94 
 
GIG 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 
   
Mean 2.1202 1.2301 2.4763 
Standard 
deviation 
2.90690 .78817 4.70307 
N 97 97 97 
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interaction condition.  At Trial 2, mean ingroup bias scores are 2.1483 in the group 
interaction condition but decreases to 1.2301 in the individual interaction condition. In 
the third trial bias is 1.2622 in the individual interaction condition and increases to 
2.4763 in the group interaction condition. Similarly to Study 1, mean bias scores are 
higher when group membership is salient as compared to mean bias scores when group 
membership is masked, over all three trials. Once again, the quadratic trend indicates 
that there is more ingroup favouritism in giving in the group conditions as more tokens 
are allocated to the ingroup than the outgroup. As group membership is masked in the 







As anticipated, the main effects for time was not significant (Wilks’ Lamda= 0.997, F (2, 
 
188) = 0.249, p = 0.780, η2 = 0.003). The main effect for group visibility was also not 






The interaction effect (Wilks’ Lamda= 0.899, F (2, 188) = 10.518, p = 0.00, η2 = 0.101) 
showed that the mean levels of ingroup bias was significantly different across the three 
trials. As expected, the interaction effect of time and group visibility was greater in this 
study than in study one where F (2) = 3.514, p = 0.033, η2 = 0.060. This result provides 
further confirmation for ingroup bias being greater in the minimal group than in the 
individual condition. In addition, it also supports the finding in Study 1 that there are 
differences in ingroup bias over the trials of the game. A significant quadratic trend for the 
time and group visibility interaction was found, F (1) = 20.500, p = 0.00, η2 = 0.098, as 
displayed in Figure 8. Box’s method confirms these significant effects. 
 
Results of the between-groups and within-subjects planned comparisons reveal that the 
differences in mean ingroup bias between the individual and group condition for Trial 1 
were significant (t= 2.836, df= 116.893, p=0.005). These differences were also significant 
for Trial 2 (t= -3.032, df= 106.904, p= 0.003) and for Trial 3 (t= 2.477, df= 106.179, p= 
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0.015). Thus the differences in ingroup bias between the group and individual conditions at 
each trial were statistically significant. 
 
However, planned contrasts for the IGI (between-groups factor) indicate that there are 
no significant differences in ingroup bias at Trial 1 and Trial 3 (F = 0.026, df = 1, p = 
0.873). This result was expected since group membership was masked in both trials. 
The differences in ingroup bias between group membership being salient in Trial 2 and 
masked in Trial 3 were significant (F = 7.799, df = 1, p = 0.006). This effect is stronger 
than the same contrast conducted in Study 1 (where F = 1.779, df = 1, p = 0.195) which 
is attributed to the increased power of this study. The planned contrast for the GIG 
between-groups factor shows that the difference in ingroup bias between group 
membership being masked in Trial 2 and then visible in Trial 3, was significant (F= 
6.623, df = 1, p = 0.012). This result supports the minimal group hypothesis. However, 
when group membership is salient, ingroup bias scores at Trial 1 and Trial 3 are not 
significantly different from one another (F = 0.451, df = 1, p = 0.504). As the increase 
in ingroup bias at Trial 3 is not significantly different from the lower score at Trial 1, 
this study also provides no evidence for the temporal hypothesis.  
 
To further investigate the temporal hypothesis, a correlation between the 15 rounds of a 
trial (where group membership was visible) and the number of tokens only allocated to 
the ingroup in each round (i.e. homogenous ties) was conducted. That is, the trials 
where group membership was visible, was correlated with the number of tokens only 
allocated to the ingroup, for that particular trial. This was done in order to explore 
whether ingroup bias was greater in some trials compared to others (i.e. trial 3 versus 
trial 1) so as to determine whether ingroup increased over time. Table 10 displays the 
correlation coefficients for Trial 1 and Trial 3 where group membership is visible in 














 Note. * indicates a significant correlation. n=15 refers to the number of rounds.  
 
Since only three of the correlations were significant, this analysis shows that ingroup bias 
does not increase in a linear fashion when group membership is visible, as the rounds of the 
trial progress. Scatterplots of the correlations indicate a similar pattern of how homogenous 
ties were distributed over the rounds. Figures 10, 11, 12 and 13, are presented as exemplars. 
Figures 10 and 11 represents Trial 1 and Trial 3 for a single experiment, respectively and 
Figures 12 and 13 also represents Trial 1 and Trial 3 for a single experiment.  
 
 
Table 10. Correlation coefficients   
Experiment Correlation coefficient of no. 
of homogenous ties per round 
of Trial 1 
Correlation coefficient of no. 
of homogenous ties per round 
of Trial 3 
1 r = -0.012, n = 15, p = 0.968 r = 0.375, n = 15, p = 0.168 
 
2 r = 0.256, n = 15, p = 0.375 
 
r = 0.506, n = 15, p = 0.054* 
 
3 r = -0.082, n = 15, p = 0.771 
 
r = -0.174, n = 15, p = 0.534 
 
4 r = -0.659, n = 15, p = 0.008* 
 
r = -0.340, n = 15, p = 0.215 
 
5 r = 0.088, n = 15, p = 0.756 
 
r = 0.301, n = 15, p = 0.276 
 
6 r = -0.136, n = 15, p = 0.629 
 
r = -0.163, n = 15, p = 0.562 
 
7 r = -0.359, n = 15, p = 0.189 
 




























































Homogenous ties per round of Trial 3
 
















































These graphs illustrate the distributions where homogenous ties did not increase at a constant 
rate. Ingroup bias did not amplify linearly when group membership was made salient for the 
second time in Trial 3, as hypothesized. Rather, it appears from the distribution that it 
changed as the rounds of the experiment changed thus explaining why the temporal 
hypothesis was not supported.  
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Conclusions of the inferential analysis 
Once again, a mixed within-subjects and between-groups repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted to test the minimal group and temporal hypotheses. As expected, the interaction 
effect was stronger in Study 2 compared to Study 1, however the results only provide 
evidence for the minimal group hypothesis. Despite the increased power of this study, the 
variance in ingroup bias scores is still relatively large (see Table 9). The ANOVA addressed 
group differences in ingroup bias however individual differences  
 
It was therefore hypothesized that there are other behaviours also operant in the interaction 
which this traditional method of analysis is unable to reveal. Aschenbrenner & Schaefer 
(1980) argued that analysis of variance for data that is multimodal is limited, as it masks 
rather than reveals what is actually going on in the data (p. 396). This limitation was evident 
in the repeated measures ANOVA being unable to reveal how homogenous ties increase and 
decrease over the rounds of the trials where group membership was salient. Wellman (1983) 
also discussed problems with traditional inferential statistics and argued that they explain 
behaviour in terms of the individual while neglecting the structural relationships that emerge 
from individuals’ social interactions. Furthermore, since it is the evolution of the repeated 
games across time that is of interest, a form of analysis that relies less on averages and more 
on patterns of relationships is required.  
 
 
It is therefore clear that the above analysis did not account for the 1) relations emerging from 
participants exchanging tokens, and 2) the conditions of the social context in each round of 
the experiment. The analysis therefore succumbed to the problem of “methodological 
individualism” (Wellman, 1983, p. 165). In order to attend to this limitation, SNA methods 
were employed to detect effects in the context of individual differences. SNA enabled the 
study of 1) the social relations between participants and 2) the patterns of behaviour other 










Chapter five: Social network analysis 
As SNA is a fairly new method of analysis used in social psychology research, this chapter 
 
begins with a basic explanation of social networks. This method is then related to the ‘Give 
and Get’ data. Following this is a summary of the results from a content analysis of one 
experiment. Here, expectations of the other behaviours hypothesized to be operating in the 
interaction are explored. Evidence of these expected behaviours are then demonstrated via 
results from the model estimation. 
 
 
What is a social network? 
Knoke and Yang (2008) define a social network as “a structure composed of a set of actors, 
 
some of whose members are connected by a set of one or more relations” (p. 8). In other 
words, a social network is produced when entities interact and form relations with one 
another. These entities can be individuals and or groups and are referred to as actors or 
nodes. Their relations are represented by the ties or edges that link them to one another 
(Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, & Labianca, 2009). Networks are displayed via socio-grams which 
are two dimensional diagrams. These diagrams display the relations between actors in a 
given context. A circle represents the actors and a line between them signifies their tie, i.e. 
their interaction. Edges that are accompanied by an arrow are indicative of a directed graph 
as the arrow displays who is directing the edge toward whom (Hanneman, 2005). Figure 14 
represents a directed network comprised of three actors, i, j and h, where there is a relation 
between actors i and j, actors j and h and actors i and h. 
 
 











Social network analysis and the ‘Give and Get’ data 
The social network perspective allows one to study social interaction in terms of the relations 
 
between actors. Consequently, this method surpasses traditional analysis methods as the unit 
of analysis is the relation between actors. In addition, SNA accounts for the context in which 
the interaction occurs (Wellman, 1983). 
 
 
SNA is based on three assumptions namely, 1) relations develop when actors interact 
with one another, 2) the spatial arrangement of these interacting entities has implications 
for the relations between them, and 3) the nature of the relation is a dynamic process that 
is subject to continual change (Knoke & Yang, 2008). In addition, an actor’s interaction 
with other actors connects them to one another and this relation influences how they 
subsequently relate to and interact with one another. SNA analyses these interactions by 
fitting a model to the data to describe the salient behaviours in the interaction. 
 
 
This method is therefore suited to examine the ‘Give and Get’ data. Since actors and their 
ties are the fundamental elements of a social network, it is clear that social networks are 
produced in the ‘Give and Get’ game. This is because the actors (participants) exchange 
tokens between one another and these exchanges form ties or relations between them. By 
fitting a model that best describes the relations between participants in the game, this method 
1) enables an analysis that extends beyond the individual level and, 2) makes it possible for 
the other behaviours hypothesized to be operant in the interaction, to be revealed. 
 
 
These other behaviours include fairness and reciprocity. In addition to ingroup 
favouritism, fairness was also found to be operant in the original study as "All of the 
choices in the experiments can be conceived as tending to achieve a compromise between 
F [fairness) and the other variables ... all choices hover around distances not too far from 
the point of maximum fairness" (Tajfel et al., 1971 p. 173, emphasis in the original). 
Others have also argued against ingroup bias and its related social identity explanation. 
Instead they propose that participants treated ingroup members favourably as they 
expected similar favourable treatment in return and hypothesize that reciprocity is operant 
in the interaction (Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). Fairness and reciprocity were explored 






Here, the relations between participants were examined in each round of the experiment. In 
 
order to do this, the social networks produced in each round were visualized. In other 
words, the actors (participants) and edges (token exchanges between participants) were 
graphically arranged in terms of the token allocations which occurred in each round. This 
arrangement reveals the deeper structure of the network (Hanneman, 2005). This is of 
particular interest to this analysis as the structure will indicate whether the relations 
between participants were based on 1) favouring members of the ingroup over the outgroup 
(i.e. ingroup bias), 2) equitable token distribution between ingroup and outgroup members 
(i.e. fairness), and or 3) distributing tokens to ingroup and outgroup members based on the 
expectation that the exchange will be reciprocated (i.e. reciprocity). The raw data used for 
this analysis was recorded in a MSExcel format as seen in Figure 15.  
 
 
Figure 15. Raw data used for SNA analysis 
 
sendFrom sendTo timeElapsed tokens experimentId 
5 4 2.5 1 A 
8 6 3.2 1 A 
2 1 1.1 1 A 
9 1 .8 1 A 
Note. The figures in this table are arbitrary.  
 
The data included the following information: 
 sendFrom: representing the sender of a token,  
 sendTo: indicating the receiver of a token, 
 timeElapsed: denoting the time taken for the exchange to occur, 
 tokens: specifying the number of tokens exchanged, and  
 experimentId: showing the experiment name.  
 
 
This format was imported into a text document, to visualise the data. The text document 
was then opened in Visual Social Networks (VISONE) which is a SNA software 
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programme. A separate network was created for each round. The defining attributes or 
characteristics of each node (group membership in this case) was then added to the data. 
Subsequently, a network visualisation was created in VISONE, which illustrated the 
connections between actors as indicated in Figure 16.  
  






It is clear that more ties are established between ingroup members than between ingroup and 
outgroup members. There are four main actors in this network. They connect all but one of 
the actors who self-allocates their token and is therefore excluded from the giant component. 
 
Results 
The conditions of this experiment were such that ties and balances were visible in all three 
 
trials. Trial 1 was a group condition, Trial 2 was an individual condition and Trial 3 was 
a group condition. Token exchanges in each round of the experiment was examined from 
the network graphs visualized for each round. The analysis showed similar patterns of 
behaviour common to each round of the experiment which are reported below. 
 
 
Trial 1: Group condition 
 
 There were more tokens allocated to the ingroup than to the outgroup, for both 
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 There were particular participants who exchanged tokens between one another 
exclusively. This occurred from previous rounds into subsequent rounds for both 
within group and between group token exchanges. It suggests that reciprocity may 
be operant in the interaction. 
 
 
 Participants allocated tokens to themselves, even though they were not explicitly 
made aware of this possibility. Once the first self-allocation occurred, it was taken 
up by two more participants who subsequently self-allocated their tokens 
intermittently in the remaining seven rounds. Three other participants also self-
allocated but, only once. Self-allocation served the interest of the group. This 
suggests that visibility of the interaction is important as it enables salient 
behaviours to be taken up and enacted. 
 
 

































































Player 6 continues to allocate their token to an outgroup member since round one. Ties 
established from token allocations in the previous round are reciprocated in this round, 
















































Self-giving is taken up by two other players in this round. Reciprocation between members 












































Players 7 and 13 continue to allocate their tokens in a self-giving manner in this round as 
well. Players 8 and 5 continue their exclusive token exchanges from the previous round 
into this one. 
 
 
Trial 2: Individual condition1  
 
 As expected, there were more tokens distributed between groups than tokens 
distributed within groups. There is thus no evidence for ingroup bias operant in 
this condition. Same group members’ spatial locations were more random. 
 
 
 Token exchanges between particular players continued from previous into 
                                               
1 Even though group membership was masked in the individual condition, actors’ group 
assignments were still recorded for a comparison of ingroup bias between the individual and 
group conditions. Here, group membership is displayed in order to show the extent of ingroup 
bias and other behaviours operant in the interaction, when group membership is masked.  
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 Those players who received more tokens in previous rounds, compared to the rest of 
the players, were allocated a lesser amount or zero tokens in subsequent rounds. This 
suggests that there may be a tendency towards fairness, i.e. allocating tokens to those 
with a lower balance. 
 
 
    Self-giving also occurred in this trial, but it served the interest of the individual. 
When players self-allocated, they were also allocated a lesser amount or zero tokens 




    Figures 20, 21, and 22 provide exemplars of the behaviours manifested in this trial: 
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Players 1, 4, 9, 5, 10, 7 and 13 do not receive tokens in this round. Players 1, 4 and 9 were 
also not allocated a token in the previous round. Two of the five players who received the 
highest number of tokens in the previous rounds, received zero tokens in this round. 
Players 12, 3, 6, 14 receive the most tokens in this round, where players 14 and 3 adopt 
the self- allocation strategy. Only players 11 and 12 extend their exchange from the 
















































Players 13 and 14 who were excluded from the network in the previous round are 
connected to the network, even though they receive zero tokens. Player 14 self-allocated in 
the previous round but receives no tokens in this round. In this round, players 9, 2, and 1 
are excluded from the broader network, all of whom allocate a token to player 2. Players 1, 
4, 9, 14, 13, 6 and 11 do not receive tokens in this round. Players 6 and 5; and players 10 
and 12 extend their token exchanges from the previous round into the current one. Players 
7, 8 and 2 receive the most tokens in this round. Players 7 and 2 also use the self-allocation 








































The network is connected in this round. Players 7, 8 and 2, who received the most tokens in 
the previous round, only receive one token in this round. Players 1, 3 and 5 receive no 
tokens in this round. Players who did not receive tokens in the previous round, received a 
token in this round. Only players 14 and 4 receive more than one token in this round, and 
the second token allocated to player 4 was self-allocated. Players 11 and 12; and players 5 
and 6 continue their token exchange from the previous round into this one. 
 
 
Trial 3: Group condition 
 
 
 Within group allocations were greater than between group allocations, 
providing evidence for ingroup bias. 
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    Same group members, particularly the orange group were exclusively arranged in 
close proximity to one another as compared to yellow group members. The yellow 
group engaged in more outgroup giving than the orange group. This explains the 
yellow group members crossing group boundaries as they were positioned and 
connected to the outgroup instead of their ingroup. This supports the evidence that 




    It appeared that token allocations in subsequent rounds were dependent on whether 
players received too many, too few or zero tokens in previous rounds. This 
provides evidence for fairness operating in the interaction. 
 
 
    Token exchanges between certain players were continued over a minimum of 
two rounds. This occurred for both within and between group exchanges. 
 
 
    10 of the 17 instances of self-giving in this trial was made by one particular player. 
The marked increase of self-allocation in this trial may be due to the fact that the 
allocation served the group’s interest. 
 
 
    Figures 23, 24, and 25 provide exemplars of the behaviours manifested in this trial: 
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There are ten homogenous and four heterogeneous ties in this connected network. When 
compared to the previous round, this round shows a decrease of ingroup giving by one 
token and an increase of across group giving by one token. Only players 2 and 10 of the 
orange group allocates a token to an outgroup member compared to the rest of the group 
who allocates their tokens to player 10.  In round 2, players 4, 3, 10 and 9 received zero 
tokens. Players 9 and 10 received a single token each in round 3 and players 3 and 4 were 
not allocated a token once again. However, in this round, players 3 and 4 each receive two 
tokens, player 9 receives four tokens and player 10 receives five tokens. Players 10 and 6 















































The network is not connected. There is a definite delimitation between the groups, bar 
players 12 and 14 who are connected to their outgroup. Players 3, 4, 9, and 10 who accrued 
the highest number of tokens in the previous round, receive no tokens in the current round. 
When compared to the previous round, the number of homogenous and heterogeneous ties 
increase by one token and decrease by one token respectively. Thus there are 11 
homogenous ties and three heterogeneous ties. The only player not connected to the network 
is player 7, who self- allocates for the second time. Players 6, 5 and 8 receive the most 









































In the current round there are only eight homogenous ties and six heterogeneous ties. When 
compared to the previous round, there is a decrease of three tokens in ingroup giving and an 
increase of three tokens in across group giving. Two members of each group are located 
away from where their groups are clustered and player 7 is excluded from the network once 
more. Even though they are members of the opposite group, players 6 and 12 continue their 
token allocations from the previous round into this one. Players 5 and 4 and 13 and 2 also 
continue their token exchanges from the previous round into the current one. Players 6 and 
5 who received the highest number of tokens in the previous round receive zero tokens in 
this round. Players 2, 4, 1 and 12 receive the most tokens in this trial. 
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Overall summary of the content analysis 
The content analysis suggests that 1) in addition to ingroup bias, fairness and reciprocation 
 
are also employed by actors in the interaction and, 2) visibility of the interaction appears to 
be an important factor as players’ actions inform how others subsequently act. However, as 
these tentative conclusions were not statistically analyzed in the content analysis, a SNA 
model estimation was conducted to assess whether 1) ingroup bias, reciprocity and fairness 
were operant in the interaction and, 2) whether visibility of the interaction enables 




Social network analysis model estimation 
In this section, the model best suited to explain the data is described. The model estimation 
procedure is then described after which the results are presented. 
 
 
A stochastic actor based model 
The ‘Give and Get’ game data is considered longitudinal network data. This is because the 
tie exchanges between the players were temporally ordered by each round and repeated 
measurements were made on the exchanges (Snijders, 2005). As the data reflected the 
change in interaction over time for a constant set of actors, a stochastic actor based model 
was employed (Snijders, 2001). As the name implies, stochastic actor based models are actor 
oriented. They are used to study the relations between actors who maintain and have control 
over their directed edges with other actors. In the ‘Give and Get’ game actors control with 
whom they establish edges. It is assumed that these relations are determined by the actor’s 




In this model, changes to the network can only be made one tie change at a time (Snijders, 
 
van de Bunt & Steglich, 2009). Based on a continuous time Markov chain, it is assumed 
that even though the evolution of the network is evident at specific observation instances, 
network changes continue to occur at random as time progresses (Snijders, 2001). This 
means that the network evolves between discrete points in time and that the current state of 
the network determines how the network will subsequently change. In other words, the 
network structure is the specific social context which is assumed to influence how the 




In terms of the ‘Give and Get’ game, visibility of the interaction enable actors to be aware 
of the current state of the network. Knowledge of how tokens were allocated influences 
whether allocations will change or remain the same in subsequent rounds. The model 
therefore operates via a feedback loop. A feedback loop simply means that at each moment 
in time, the network influences the possibility of future network changes. 
 
 
Changes to the structure of the network are assumed to either be endogenously or 
 
exogenously determined. In terms of the former, network changes are considered to be a 
result of the network structure. The network changes because current interactions and 
changes in the network are influenced by both previous interactions and previous changes 
that occurred within the network (Snijders, van de Bunt, Steglich, 2009). VIAPPL rendered 
the interaction visible, thus it is hypothesized that actors changed their allocations to 
demonstrate ingroup bias and the hypothesized fairness and reciprocity. This is because 
these behaviours were manifested in previous rounds and actors were aware of the actions 
of others. The latter change determinant concerns network changes based on the actors’ 
attributes (i.e. the specific characteristics of actors e.g. group membership). These are 
referred to as actor covariates. It is thus anticipated that the network changes because of 1) 
tie formations in previous rounds of the game which are influential in subsequent tie 




The objective function of stochastic actor based models determines which change to make 
in the network (i.e. which new tie to establish). It may be simply understood as a measure of 
how attractive it is to move from one network state to another. In other words, it is the 
potential to change the interaction so that the network is changed (Snijders, 2005). As 
previously mentioned, stochastic actor based models assume that changes occur as a result of 
the theoretically relevant information that actors utilize in deciding with whom to form ties. 
This information includes the endogenous and exogenous effects and are included in the 
objective function (Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich, 2009, p. 9). This thesis posits that 
ingroup bias, fairness and reciprocity (endogenous effects) as well as group membership (an 
exogenous effect) are factors that influence changes to the network structure. Thus linear 
effects representing these factors were included in the model. This decision was dependent 
on the theoretical underpinnings of the research, principles of SNA as well as driven by the 
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data itself, as Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich (2009) recommend.  The model is 
progressively built by a series of ad hoc procedures where effects were added (forward steps) 
and removed (backward steps) from the model (Snijders, van de Bunt & Steglich, 2009), 
until the desired model was created. 
 
 
Estimating a model 
Due to computational complexity models cannot be accurately computed. Instead ‘the 
 
method of moments’ is used to estimate the expected results, which approximate the 
averages over simulated networks from the observed or target values calculated from the 
actual data. The outcome of this procedure are parameters of the expected results which are 
estimated from the observed data. Ideally, the expected values (parameters) ought to be 
equal to their observed values (Snijders, 2009). In other words, the estimation procedure 
builds a model by fitting the observed results of the data to the expected results. Parameters 
are estimated by choosing statistics that yielded equal expected and observed values. 
 
 
Actor based models include a random element to account for why observed data may 
deviate from what is theoretically hypothesized (Snijders, 2001). Since deviations are 
likely, the fit of the model is tested. This is done by testing how close the expected and 
observed values are to one another, via the t-ratio (Ripley, Snijders & Preciado, 2012). The 
t-ratio assesses the average and standard deviations between the expected and observed 
values. Ideally, the t-ratio should be 0.0 but the model is considered an excellent fit when 
the t-ratios are “less than 0.1 in absolute value, reasonable when they are less than 0.2 and 
moderate when they are less than 0.3” (Ripley, Snijders & Preciado, 2012, pp. 87-88). 
 
 
A model for the VIAPPL data 
The aim of the model estimation procedure was to reveal the “intervening link” of “social 
 
mechanisms” discussed by Baker and Faulkner (1993, p. 842). The intervening link refers 
to reasons that account for certain behaviours in an interaction. It is anticipated that the 
effects included in the model will clarify 1) whether the network structure and its evolution 
were based on ingroup bias, reciprocity and fairness operant in the interaction and, 2) 
whether visibility of the interaction enables subsequent actions of actors to be informed by 
how others allocated their tokens in previous rounds. The specific effects outlined below 
were included in the model as they address the above assertions. These effects are 
explained and the specific hypotheses related to the model estimation are outlined.  
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Effects included in the Social network analysis model 
 
Outdegree density 
Meaning: Outdegree density is the ability to have ties in the network and is the number of 
outgoing ties. Outdegree is influenced by all other effects (Snijders, 2009). 
 
Meaning in relation to the ‘Give and Get’ game: Outdegree density represents the density 
of the number of outgoing ties. As all actors are limited to allocating a single token per round, 
their outdegree densities are expected to be similar. This effect seems obvious to include as it 
indicates that ties were formed. However Snijders, van de Bunt, and Steglich (2009, p. 11) 
argue that it forms the “basic feature of most social networks” and is conventionally included 
in all models.  
 
H0: Outdegree density will not be significant in either condition.  




Meaning: Reciprocity is the number of reciprocated ties for an actor. It is a direct exchange 
where an actor x makes an allocation to actor y and actor y, in turn makes an allocation back 
to actor x (Ripley, Snijders & Preciado, 2012).  
 
Meaning in relation to the ‘Give and Get’ game: Reciprocity models the tendency towards 
reciprocated token allocations in the interaction. Reciprocity is calculated retrospectively over 
the 15 rounds of a trial. In other words, it is the reciprocated ties between consecutive rounds. 
If this effect is significant it will confirm that actors exchange tokens on the basis that their 
exchange will be reciprocated. 
 
H0: Reciprocity will not be significant in the individual and group conditions.  







Meaning: Balance accounts for actors establishing ties to those who have similar outgoing 
ties as themselves. In other words, this effect considers how many same choices and non-
same choices were made (Ripley, Snijders & Preciado, 2012). Actors who show this tendency 
prefer to form ties to other actors who make the same choices as themselves.  
 
Meaning in relation to the ‘Give and Get’ game: This effect will show whether actors 
allocate tokens to ingroup or outgroup actors in the same way. If balance is significant it will 
indicate that actors distribute tokens to those who form ties similarly to themselves. This 
means that actors are distributing their tokens to ingroup, outgroup or individual actors in a 
similar fashion. This effect therefore provides evidence for observation of the interaction 
informing how tokens were allocated. 
 
H0: Balance will not be significant in the individual and group condition.  
H1: Balance will be significant in both the individual and group conditions.  
 
Number of actors at distance 2 
Meaning: Number of actors at distance 2 reflects the number of actors to whom actor i is 
indirectly tied through one intermediary or more. Negative parameters indicate a preference 
for more direct ties located in smaller networks whereas positive parameters indicate a 
larger, indirectly related and open network (Ripley, Snijders & Preciado, 2012). 
 
Meaning in relation to the ‘Give and Get’ game: The meaning of the significance of 
number of actors at distance 2 will depend on whether the parameters are negative or 
positive. Positive parameters will provide evidence for fairness as ties are not concentrated in 
smaller cliques of nodes. Instead ties are indirectly established between larger groups of 
actors. Negative parameters on the hand, will provide evidence for ties being concentrated in 
smaller networks. If significant in the group condition, it provides evidence for ingroup bias 
(as ties are clustered between certain ingroup members) or that ties are clustered by 
neighbours (i.e. tokens are allocated to close neighbours of the sender).   
 




H1: Number of actors at distance 2 will be significant in the individual and group conditions. 
 
Out-in degree assortivity 
Meaning: Out-in degree assortivity reflects the tendency for actors with high outdegrees 
who allocate tokens widely in the network to be preferably tied to actors with high in-
degrees (Ripley, Snijders & Preciado, 2012). Here, outdegree refers to the number of targets 
that are high. In other words, actors allocate their tokens to many actors in the network and 
do not allocate tokens to the same actors repeatedly.  
 
Meaning in relation to the ‘Give and Get’ game: The meaning of the significance of out-
in degree assortivity will depend on whether the parameters were negative or positive. If out-
in degree assortivity is significant and the parameters are positive it suggests that actors 
whose allocations are widespread (i.e. they allocate tokens to various other actors in the 
network), prefer to distribute tokens to those actors who have a high number of incoming 
ties. This result provides evidence for giving more tokens those who have already accrued 
tokens, i.e. the opposite of fairness. However, evidence for fairness is demonstrated when the 
parameters are negative as the same actors whose allocations are widespread prefer to 
allocate tokens to actors with a low number of incoming tokens. 
 
H0: Out-in degree assortivity will not be significant in both the individual and group 
conditions.  
H1: Out-in degree assortivity will be significant in both the individual and group conditions. 
 
Same group no. 
Meaning: Same group no. refers to the actor covariate (i.e. group membership in this case). 
It is the measure of the tendency to have ties between actors with the exact same value of the 
covariate and represents direct ingroup bias (Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich, 2009). 
 
Meaning in relation to the ‘Give and Get’ game: The homophily hypothesis which states 
that actors are more likely to form a relationship with similar others as they share the same 
attributes, formed the basis of this analysis (Yuan & Gay, 2006; Veenstra & Steglich, 2012). 
This is because the repeated measures ANOVA showed that ingroup bias was greater in 
trials with visible group membership than masked group membership. Since ties between 
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ingroups are an indicator of ingroup bias, the aim of this model estimation procedure was to 
examine whether one’s group membership was the key marker or driver of the interaction in 
the game. If the effect is significant it will provide evidence that actors’s ties are influenced 
by group membership.  
 
H0: There is no difference in the significance of same group no. between the individual and 
group conditions.  
H1: Same group no. will be significant in the group condition but not in the individual 
condition, as group membership is masked. 
 
Group no. of indirect ties 
Meaning: Group no. of indirect ties refers to the preference of actors to be indirectly tied to 
other members of the ingroup rather than members of the outgroup (Ripley, Snijders & 
Preciado, 2012). In other words, actors prefer to be indirectly tied to other ingroup actors 
rather than be indirectly tied to outgroup actors. This effect demonstrates an indirect form of 
ingroup bias where actors prefer being connected to their own group members over outgroup 
members.  
 
Meaning in relation to the ‘Give and Get’ game: If group no. of indirect ties is significant 
it provides for an indirect form of ingroup bias as actors prefer to be indirectly tied to other 
ingroup actors rather than indirectly tied to outgroup actors. 
 
H0: There is no difference in the significance of group no. of indirect ties between the 
individual and group conditions.  
H1: Group no. of indirect ties is significant in the group condition but not in the individual 
condition, as group membership is masked. 
 
 
These effects were used to establish the overall hypotheses of the SNA model estimation. The 











H0: Fairness is not significant in both the individual and group interactions. 
 
 
H1: Fairness is significant in in both the individual and group interactions. 
Reciprocity 
hypothesis 




H1: Reciprocity is significant in both the individual and group interactions. 
Ingroup bias 
hypothesis  





H1: Ingroup bias is significant in the group condition and not significant in 




Fitting the model to the ‘Give and Get’ game data 
SNA programmes, VISONE and Simulation Investigation for Empirical Network Analysis 
 
(SIENA) (http://www.stats.ox.ac.uk/~snijders/siena/ ) were used for visualising and 
estimating parameters of the model for the data, respectively. VISONE is a programme 
enabled to create and use models and algorithms to integrate and advance visualisations 
and analysis of social networks (http://visone.info/html/about.html). SIENA, a specialised 
package in R, conducts the statistical estimation of actor based models for repeated 
measures data (Ripley, Snijders, Preciado, 2012). Visualisations of networks were created 
prior to the model fitting procedure and there were 45 serparate networks that were 
visualised for each game. For the model estimation procedure, a network collection was 
created from the 15 networks (as there were 15 rounds in each trial) of one trial of each 
experiment. Thereafter the model was fitted to each trial of the experiment. 
 
 
The results were also subject to Fisher’s combined probability test for an overall meta-
analysis of the results. This secondary analysis is often used to verify the results of social 
network model estimations (Mercken, Snijders, Steglich & de Vries, 2009). This method 
combined the results from the separate independent tests with the same null hypothesis and 
it assessed whether the multiple tests with the same null hypothesis can reject a shared null 
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hypothesis (Whitlock, 2005). The test combined the probability 




The natural logarithms of the p-values were calculated in MSExcel and were then converted 
to χ2 by multiplying the sum of the log of the probability values by negative two. The 
degrees of freedom were then calculated by multiplying the number of probability values 
by a value of two. Once these values were calculated the final probability statistic was 
computed using an online statistics calculator found at 
http://www.stat.tamu.edu/~west/applets/chisqdemo.html. By calculating Fishers combined 
probability one is able to determine the probability of the hypothesis of many independent 
tests. If Fishers combined probability is significant then at least one of the separate alternate 
hypotheses are true (i.e. it provides confirmation that the effect is significant). But, if 
Fishers combined probability is not significant, then all of the separate null hypotheses are 




The data from Study 1 was excluded from this analysis. This is because ties were masked 
and participants had no knowledge of the current state of the network. Therefore only the 
data from Study 2 were suited to this analysis. A total of 48 trials were analyzed where half 
comprised the individual condition and the other half, the group condition. Wang, Pattison 
and Robins (2012) regarded t-ratios exceeding an absolute value of 0.2 as a poor fit to their 
data. Employing their approach, it is argued that this model appropriately fits the data as 
only 4 of the 336 parameter estimates exceeded this value. Table 12 provides a summary of 




Table 12: Model estimation results 
 
Effect Relation to 
behaviour manifest 










Ability to form ties <0.0001 <0.0001 
Reciprocity Reciprocation 0.9229 0.4723 
Balance Allocating tokens 
similarly to others’ 
allocations 
<0.0001 <0.0001 
Number of actors 
at distance 2 
Fairness <0.0001 <0.0001 
Out-in degree 
assortivity 
Fairness <0.0001 <0.0001 
Same group no. Direct ingroup bias 0.0759 <0.0001 
Group no. of 
indirect ties 
Indirect ingroup bias 0.077 0.0045 
 
 
Fishers combined probability for outdegree density is significant for both the individual 
(combined p= <0.0001, df= 48) and the group (combined p= <0.0001, df= 48) condition. 
This confirms that ties were formed in each round of the game, in both the individual and 
group conditions and the null hypothesis (i.e. that outdegree density will not be significant 
in the individual and group condition) is rejected. As the parameters were negative for both 
conditions, the networks had a sparse density. This conclusion is based on Snijders, van de 
Bunt and Steglich (2010) who confirm that in most cases networks are sparse and negative 
parameters are obtained for this effect. This means that the cost to establish a tie outweighs 
the benefits of the relation. Thus the network density of the ‘Give and Get’ game is low 
because even though actors allocate their tokens they are not guaranteed of receiving 




The results of Fishers combined probability confirms that reciprocity was not operant in 
both the individual (p= 0.9229, df= 48) and group (p= 0.4723, df= 48) conditions. The 
parameters were also low as they were far from the expected values i.e. between 1 and 2 
(Snijders, van den Bunt & Steglich, 2010). Therefore, the null hypothesis that reciprocity 
is not significant in both the individual and group interactions, is true. This means that even 
though the interaction was made visible to actors, their exchanges were not based on the 
expectation that their allocations will be reciprocated.  
 
 
It appears that Fishers combined probability for balance is significant in both in the 
individual (p= <0.0001, df= 48) and group (p= <0.0001, df= 48) conditions. Thus the null 
hypothesis (i.e. that balance will not be significant in the individual and group conditions) 
can be rejected. The results of this effect indicate that actors allocate tokens to other actors 
who make the same choices with regards to token allocations. But, actors could only make 
such a choice by knowing with whom other actors’ established ties, enabled by the 
interaction being visible. These results therefore support the notion that observing the 
interaction informed the way tokens were allocated in subsequent rounds of the game. 
 
 
Fishers combined probability for number of actors at distance 2 is significant for both the 
individual (p= <0.0001, df= 48) and group (p= <0.0001, df= 48) conditions. Thus the null 
hypothesis (i.e. that number of actors at distance 2 will not be significant in both the 
individual and group conditions) is rejected. The parameters are positive for both 
conditions. This means that in both the individual and group conditions, actors showed a 
preference for more open networks where they prefer to be indirectly tied through 
intermediaries. In other words, they prefer sharing resources throughout the network rather 
than accumulating resources in smaller ‘exclusive’ networks. This provides evidence for 
fairness operant in the interaction where actors share their tokens throughout the network as 
opposed to accumulating ties in cliques.  
 
 
Fishers combined probability for out-in degree assortivity is significant for both the 
individual (p= <0.0001, df= 48) and group (p= <0.0001, df= 48) conditions. Thus, the null 
hypothesis (i.e. that out-in degree assortivity will not be significant in both the individual 
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and group conditions) is rejected. Since the parameters are negative, for both individual and 
group conditions, it suggests that actors with high outdegrees who allocate tokens widely, 
that is who do not repeatedly allocate tokens to the same actors, prefer to allocate tokens to 
nodes with a low number of incoming ties. This result provides evidence for actors 
distributing their tokens fairly, i.e. allocating tokens to those with a low token balance. 
 
 
As expected, Fishers combined probability for same group no. is not significant for the 
individual condition (p= 0.0759, df= 48), but is significant for the group condtion (p= 
<0.0001, df=48) conditions. Thus the null hypothesis (i.e. that there is no difference in same 
group no. between the individual and group conditions) is rejected. This means that direct 
ingroup bias is evident in the group condition but not in individual condition, confirming the 
findings of the inferential analysis. 
 
 
Similarly, Fishers combined probability for group no. of indirect ties is not significant for 
the individual condition (p= 0.077, df= 48), but is significant for the group condition (p= 
0.0045, df= 48) conditions. The null hypothesis (i.e. that group no. of indirect ties will not be 
significant in the individual and group conditions) is rejected. This finding provides further 
evidence that individuals prefer to be tied to their ingroups over outgroups, even in an indirect 
manner in the group interaction.  
 
 
Conclusion of the results in terms of the overall Social network 
analysis hypotheses  
 
The results of the model estimation provide evidence that: 
 
 Reciprocity was not operant in the interaction. Actors’ token exchanges were not 
guided by the expectation that their exchange will be reciprocated as reciprocity was 
not significant in either of the conditions. The null hypothesis (i.e. that reciprocity is 
not significant in both the individual and group interactions) is true. 
 
 
 Fairness was operant in the interaction in both the individual and group conditions 
since 1) actors showed a preference for more open networks by distributing tokens 
throughout the network rather than accumulating tokens in smaller ‘exclusive’ 
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networks (significant number of actors at distance 2 effect), and 2) actors who 
allocated tokens widely in the network, preferred to allocate tokens to others with a 
low token balance, (significant out-in degree assortivity effect). Thus the alternate 





 Ingroup bias was operating in the interaction since actors directly (significant same 
group no. effect in the group condition) and indirectly (significant group no. of 
indirect ties effect in the group condition) favoured their ingroup over the outgroup 
in the group interaction condition. Thus the alternate hypothesis, that ingroup bias 
is significant in the group condition and not significant in the individual 
interaction, is true. 
 
 
 In addition it was found that observing the interaction informed the way tokens 
were allocated as actors distributed their tokens to others with similar patterns of 
outgoing ties (significant balance effect in both conditions).  
 
 However, it must be noted that these findings require further investigation as they 





Chapter six: Discussion and conclusion 
This research study was designed to address the aforementioned critiques of the original 
 
minimal group study, namely the missing social and temporal features of the interaction as 
well as the possibility of an experimental artefact producing the results. Therefore, the 
methodology employed in this research allowed for the study of 1) social interaction 
between the participants, 2) how the interaction unfolded over time and, 3) behavioural 
outcomes when no between-group allocations were specified. 
 
 
The results from the inferential analysis supported the original findings by Tajfel et al. 
(1971) as participants’ demonstrated ingroup bias to a greater extent in the group condition 
than in the individual condition. This analysis contributed to the original findings in two 
ways. Firstly, by including a temporal component to this research design, the analysis was 
able to show evidence that ingroup bias is not static. Despite no support for the temporal 
hypothesis, the correlation of ingroup bias scores over the rounds of trials with group 
membership visible, indicated that ingroup bias does not remain at the same. Instead, it 
changes by increasing and decreasing as the rounds of the game change. Secondly, the 
analysis revealed that the interaction effects for group visibility and time were stronger 
when the interaction was made visible to the participants. Thus, visibility of interaction is 
important as it amplifies the level of ingroup bias that is manifested. Despite the inferential 
analysis producing these findings, it was limited in its ability to account for the social 
relations between participants. Consequently, it was unable to reveal the additional 
behaviours operant in the interaction. Hence SNA was employed. 
 
 
The SNA model estimation 1) suggested that ingroup bias was manifested in the group 
interaction as same group no. and group no. of indirect ties were significant in the group 
condition but not significant in the individual condition, and suggested that 2) participants 
distributed their tokens fairly in the individual as well as the group conditions, as number 
of actors at distance 2 and out-in degree assortivity were significant in both conditions, 3) 
visibility of the interaction being important as balance was significant in both conditions, 
and 4) reciprocity was not operant in the interaction. 
 
 
  The findings of the original study were interpreted in terms of a psychological imperative 
 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However others have argued that the results can also be explained 
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by the experimental artefact of the study’s design (Aschenbrenner & Schaefer, 1980). But, 
the abovementioned critique of the MGP has shown that there is ambiguity in the reasoning 
behind the once off events where social interaction is missing. This study therefore involved 
a series of social interactions between participants who observed one anothers’ actions as 
they unfolded over time. This discussion adjudicates between possible explanations of the 
results. These explanations are 1) the experimental artefact explanation, 2) the psychological 
explanation, and 3) the interactional explanation of the results. 
 
 
The experimental artefact explanation 
This thesis shows that the results from the original study are manifested even when there is 
 
no possibility of an experimental artefact explaining the findings. This is because VIAPPL 
did not constrain or influence participants’ choices, as did the original matrices. 
Participants were not advised to discriminate between the groups, the conditions of the 
trials were varied so the purpose of the experiment was not easy to deduce, there were no 
prescribed allocation strategies from which players had to choose nor were players asked 
to allocate tokens to ingroups or outgroups. Even though the experiment was not 
established in a way that ensured participants favour their ingroups over outgroups, 
ingroup bias was still found to be a significant behaviour in the interaction. In light of this, 
perhaps the experimental artefact explanation for the results may be ruled out.   
 
 
The psychological explanation 
SIT was used to argue that upon categorization into groups, individuals will inevitably 
 
display a preference for and favour their own groups over outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). This behaviour manifested because of a need to make one’s own group more 
positively distinctive from others in order to establish a positive social identity. Since 
one’s identity is related to their group identity the positive social identity produced from 
favouring one’s group resulted in enhancing their self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
 
 
The results indicated that ingroup bias was not constant over time. Instead, ingroup bias 
changed, depending on the conditions of the interaction. It was expressed to a greater 
degree when the interaction was visible compared to the interaction being masked and also 
increased and decreased intermittently when group membership was visible. Furthermore, 
the SNA model estimation revealed that fairness was also operating in the group 
interaction. Not only did individuals manifest ingroup bias, they also distributed their 
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tokens equitably within their groups. This suggests that the inevitable consequence of 
categorization is not limited to ingroup bias as other behaviours are also manifested in 
intergroup interaction. It appears that the psychological explanation is therefore insufficient 
to explain the interaction and another account is warranted. 
 
 
The interactional explanation 
Both the inferential analysis and the SNA suggested that visibility of the interaction may be 
important as 1) the repeated measures ANOVA showed that the interaction effects for group 
visibility and time were stronger when the interaction was made visible to the participants, 
compared to when the interaction was masked, and 2) balance was significant in the SNA 
model estimation, for both individual and group conditions which means that observing the 
interaction informed the way tokens were allocated. But, these tentative conclusions need to 
be further explored in order to be confirmed. However, it may be said that as ingroup bias 
and fairness become established as salient behaviours, they were employed by other actors 
with similar outgoing ties. This provides evidence for an interactional imperative as actors 
looked to others to inform their subsequent token allocations. 
 
 
Furthermore, as ingroup bias changed in different conditions of the experiment, it may be 
viewed in terms of a dynamic development. Thus the notion of “becoming” provided by 
Spears, Jetten and Doosje (2001, p. 352) is relevant to how ingroup bias is produced. This 
is because ingroup bias is 1) constituted in interaction, 2) dependent on group interaction 
for its expression, 3) is manifest to a greater extent when the interaction is rendered visible 
to participants, and 4) changes as the rounds of the game advance. The interactional 
imperative suggests that the change in ingroup bias is most concretely in terms of how the 
other participants acted. This is because observing the interaction influenced subsequent 




According to this theory, individuals’ actions are oriented towards the meaning they 
attribute to them. This meaning is derived from individuals’ interactions with others and 
when interpreted, influences their subsequent behaviour (Blumer, 1969). This notion is 
useful to understand how the temporal and visibility features of the VIAPPL enabled one 
to examine how participants rendered the interaction meaningful. By witnessing the 
majority of players allocate tokens in way that displayed 1) ingroup favouritism and 
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fairness over the rounds of the group condition, and 2) fairness over the rounds of the 
individual condition; these behaviours were taken up by more players as the interaction 
proceeded. Thus it seems that observing the actions of others were employed to render the 
allocation task meaningful and therefore framed participants’ responses. This in turn 
impacted back upon participants’ subsequent actions. 
     
 
These findings support the notion that “…social context is not static. It is made up of other 
individuals’ practices. These practices … are themselves informed in part by the 
audience’s interpretation of group members’ behaviors” (Klein, Spears & Reicher, 2007, 
p.15). In other words, ingroup bias and fairness manifest in the ‘Give and Get’ game are 
based on an interpretation of the meaning of the allocating tokens in a way that 1) favours 
the ingroup over the outgroup, as well as 2) maintaining fairness in how tokens are 
distributed. This meaning is developed by observing how other participants behave and 
from knowing who those others are (i.e. the groups to which they belong). Given the 
evidence that observing the interaction informed the way tokens were allocated it is likely 
that 
 
To behave appropriately is a powerful social motive. It is in large part responsible 
both for the attempts to preserve or to modify one’s conduct to fit a situation, and 
to change, reform or revolutionize a situation or systems of situations which 




This is because individuals allocated their tokens in a similar manner to others in the 
interaction. Reicher (1994; 1996, as cited in Postmes, Spears & Lea, 2000) and Postmes, 
Spears and Lea (2000) explain this in terms of group norms which are deduced from the 
interaction. Reicher (1994; 1996, as cited in Postmes, Spears & Lea, 2000) found that 
norms of a group emerge as group members induce them from the behaviours they 
observe when they actively participate in the interaction. Similarly, when studying how 
group norms are found in computer-mediated communication contexts, Postmes, Spears 
and Lea (2000) concluded that normative influences can be inferred as the conventional 
group behaviour develops over time. Since the interaction in the ‘Give and Get’ game was 
visible and unfolded over time, it is possible that the allocation norms of ingroup bias and 
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fairness were deduced by participants observing the interaction and were inferred as they 
developed over time. 
 
 
It appears that once ingroup giving and fairness were established as salient behaviours they 
were enacted upon as the interaction unfolded over time. This is because visibility of the 
interaction enabled individuals to inductively work out the patterns or regularities of 
behaviour of the context as they occurred in each round of the trial. This assertion is based 
on the idea that a norm “originates in out-of-the-ordinary "extramundane" social situations 
in which people may come to feel their emergent collective behavior is feasible, timely, 
permissible, necessary, or duty-bound behavior. Their collective action is seen as 
appropriate” (Aguirre, Wenger & Vigo, 1998, p. 302). Therefore it is in this treatment, of 
being accepted within the context and taken up by the players, that the ingroup bias and 
fairness norms were produced. It was not outside of the situation or an already established 
framework that guided the way participants acted. Rather it was in the situation where these 
behaviours were accomplished that they became established as normative. 
 
 
Contribution of this thesis 
This thesis critiqued the original MGP as a method to study ingroup bias. It was argued that 
 
methodological shortcomings resulted in an individualized explanation of this social 
phenomenon and succumbed to the general problematic of social science research. 
Drawing on the work of Billig (2002), the critique was not aimed to reject the seminal 
work but rather to develop a social understanding of the behaviours operant in this 
minimal group interaction. The contribution of this thesis methodologically based as the 
investigation, analysis and explanation of the ‘Give and Get’ game interaction, aimed to 
provide a social understanding of ingroup bias.  
 
 
Firstly, VIAPPL accounted for social interaction between the participants whereas other 
laboratory experiments of intergroup behaviour do not attend to social interaction 
because 
 
an awareness of the power of interaction may have led researchers to control for 
its effects by designing it out of their research. Somewhat paradoxically, then, this 
final argument suggests that it is the very knowledge that interaction is important 
98  
that has led to research outcomes which obstruct its investigation.  
(Haslam & McGarty, 2001, p. 14) 
 
 
Therefore, the merit of VIAPPL is that it models real life social interaction where group 
differences emerge over time as they are produced in different contexts of social 
interactions. VIAPPL allowed participants to interact with one another over a period of 
time, in a virtual environment. Furthermore the temporal and visibility enabled features of 
VIAPPL allowed for the detection of 1) ingroup bias, 2) fairness, 3) observation of the 
interaction informing the interaction, and 4) reciprocation as it developed out of the 
interaction. Thus this novel methodology attended to the missing social interaction in 
laboratory experiments and thereby moved beyond an individual level investigation. It was 
able to provide a socially based method of investigation by enabling social interaction 
between groups, revealing how interaction creates connections between individuals and 
how the interaction develops and is produced over time. 
 
 
Secondly, SNA was introduced as an alternate method to study intergroup behaviour in 
social psychology. This method allowed for the study of the relations that formed when 
participants exchanged tokens and it also accounted for the conditions of the ‘Give and Get’ 
game. In order to achieve this, the unit of analysis was not the individual but rather the 
relations that formed between individuals as a result of their interaction. The analysis 
method was therefore able to extend beyond the individual level as it accounted for the 
situation and individuals’ participation in social interaction. 
 
 
Thirdly, the explanation of the interaction focussed on an interactional and relational 
understanding in lieu of the traditional psychological explanation. The interactional 
explanation argued that visibility of the interaction facilitated how actors acted in the 
‘Give and Get’ game. This is because participants were responsive to the normative 
behaviours salient in the interaction as they took up these similar ways of allocating 
tokens. It thus appears that the behaviours manifest in the ‘Give and Get’ game are based 
on the meaning attributed to the behaviour gained from watching how others behave and 
who the others are. Observing how others behaved in accordance with the norm resulted 
in players enacting the same ‘appropriate’ behaviours as their group members and other 
players. Thus individuals' behaviour was shaped by what people around them considered 
appropriate, correct or desirable. Accordingly, it may be said that the behaviours manifest 
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in this context were “identity performances” (Klein, Spears & Reicher, 2007) where 
individuals established themselves as 1) group members by allocating more tokens to 
ingroup members than outgroup members, as well as 2) actors who try to maintain 
fairness in terms of to whom they allocate tokens. These behaviours therefore produced a 
dynamic social context where there were norms about how to behave and emergent 
identities of the actors involved. Consequently, this explanation has shown that it is in the 
interactive context where individuals make meaning of the nature of the situation and the 
actions of others which shape how they behave. Hence, this explanation suggests a social 
and relational understanding of the interactions in this minimal group context. 
 
 
Furthermore, this thesis has shown that ingroup bias was not the only salient behaviour in 
this minimal group interaction. Even though fairness was highlighted as an allocation 
strategy in the original MGP, there was only one way in which it could be enacted, i.e. by 
allocating the same amount of points to the ingroup and the outgroup. But, VIAPPL on the 
other hand, placed no constraints on how individuals allocated their tokens. This 
methodological feature coupled with the SNA revealed different forms of fairness operating 
in the interaction, namely 1) fairness as trying to act equitably, 2) democratic fairness, and 3) 
fairness operating alongside ingroup bias.  
 
 
The first form of fairness was evident where actors tried to maintain a balance between those 
individuals receiving more tokens than those receiving a lesser amount, i.e. to counteract 
inequity between individuals. The second form of fairness was manifest where individuals 
allocated tokens widely in the network. These individuals did not allocate tokens to the same 
actors consistently but rather shared their tokens between many individuals. Finally, the 
third form of fairness was apparent in the group condition, where individuals shared their 
tokens between their own group members. These forms of fairness were not evident in the 
original MGP because fairness was abstracted to one possible outcome whereas VIAPPL 
allowed for multiple ways in which fairness could be produced. Thus, VIAPPL revealed 






From the above argument, it appears that the main aim of this research was achieved. 
Tajfel’s original minimal group study was replicated using a new technology which 
overcame the problems of neglecting social interaction and the temporal features of 
interaction, as well as requiring a between group allocation. To answer the overall research 
question (i.e. “Under what conditions of interaction is ingroup bias most likely to be 
manifest?”) this investigation has shown that 1) ingroup bias is most likely to be manifest in 
social interaction characterised by group categorization, 2) ingroup bias is expressed to a 
greater extent when the group interaction is visible to those within the interaction, and 3) 
ingroup bias is amplified as the group interaction unfolds over time. Furthermore, the 
investigation revealed that 1) participants distributed their tokens fairly when they acted 
with and without a group membership, 2) observing the interaction informed the way 
tokens were allocated in both conditions as participants distributed their tokens in a similar 
manner, and 3) reciprocity was not operant in the interaction. When explaining these 
findings, the experimental artefact explanation was ruled out and the interactional 
explanation was proposed in lieu of the psychological explanation. Therefore, this 
investigation moved beyond the individual level as this new framework for studies in the 
MGP suggests a social explanation of ingroup bias and the other behaviours operant in the 




Firstly, the small sample size in the first study reduced the power of the research design 
 
leading to an increased the risk of Type II error. This could be a possible reason for the small 
effect size and the non-significant probability of ingroup bias increasing over time. 
However this problem was resolved by conducting a second research study. 
 
 
Secondly, participants participated in more than one experiment, most likely for the 
monetary profit they received. As repeated measures designs are subject to carry-over and 
learning effects that impact performance in one or more of the measurements (Howell, 
2010) it is uncertain whether participants engaged fully in the experiment or they became 
“test-savvy”, resulting in the validity of the data being compromised. 
 
 
The third problem regarding the design was that it is uncertain whether the data is 
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compatible for the stochastic actor based model used in the SNA. This is because the data 
and the research design violates of three assumptions of this model. Firstly, the data 
indicates how each tie changed per round of the game and tie changes are therefore 
considered brief events. The ties do not endure but are momentary for that particular round 
in which it is established. As a result the assumption that ties between actors are states that 
endure over time and that change is gradual (Snijders, van de Bunt, Steglich, 2010) is 
violated. The data are therefore more representative of event data where ties change more 
rapidly. However it is unknown whether it is consistent for this method of analysis as event 
data can also be treated as enduring in some cases (Snijders, van de Bunt, Steglich, 2009). 
Secondly, the research design violated the assumption that the current state of the network 
determines probabilistically how the network will change as “the total network structure is 
the social context that influences probabilities of its own change” (Snijders, van de Bunt, 
Steglich, 2009, p. 6). This is because even though the interaction was visible to participants, 
the tie exchanges were presented to players after the round was completed. Players were 
unable to observe how the structure of the network changed in real time. Thus the context 
of the social network did not influence the likelihood of its own change. Thirdly, claims 
about fairness and reciprocity operating in the interaction require further investigation suign 
a more suitable model. This is because time continuous Markov chains exclude any forces 
other than those operating at the immediate moment however fairness and reciprocity both 
depend on some memory of past events.   
 
Other problems relating to the analysis were that the first round of each experiment was as 
an exemplar of how the game works and this data was not excluded from the analysis. In 
terms of the SNA, as the software did not account for the spatial distance between actors 
the number of actors at distance 2 effect included in the SNA model estimation could not 
be explained in terms of ties being clustered by neighbours (i.e. tokens are allocated to 
close neighbours of the sender). The missing spatial variable thus limited the 
interpretation. In addition, the content analysis ought to have included more formal 
criteria instead of merely counting the number of times ingroup bias, fairness and 
reciprocity was identified. Also, the content analysis should have also been conducted by 
independent raters.  
 
Multivariate methods should have been employed for the inferential analysis in order to 
better deal with the dependencies between multiple measurements on the same 
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participants. Furthermore, family-wise error should have been controlled for as there were 
many significance tests conducted on the correlations between the 15 rounds of a trial 
where group membership was visible and the number of tokens only allocated to the 
ingroup. It is also acknowledged that visibility of the ties should have been experimentally 
controlled for in the repeated measures ANOVA analysis. This would have provided 
evidence for the tentative conclusions about the importance of the visibility of the 
interaction.  In addition, demographic information like age and gender distribution for the 
samples were not collected. This should have been done as it is common practice to report 
at least the averages of the distributions in experimental research. 
 
Fourthly, the reliability and validity of the VIAPPL were established during the testing 
phase of the software development. Numerous pilot tests were conducted to ensure that 
the software was free from any bugs. Each condition was tested to ensure the software 
performed as intended. The output was also inspected to ensure accurate data. But, even 
though the design was counterbalanced to control for extraneous factors affecting the 
results and the results were not intended to be generalizable, it was subject to certain 
internal and external validity threats. 
 
Internal validity threats 
 
Once started, the research study became popular on campus leading to repeated 
participation by particular participants. The impact of the threat of co-varying events 
(Tredoux & Smith, 2006) is likely as it cannot be ruled out that participants did not discuss 
their token allocation strategies with one another, outside of the research context. 
Consequently, it could have impacted upon their actions in subsequent experiments and 
not be an accurate reflection of their behaviour if the research presented a novel situation. 
The reactive effects to participation (Tredoux & Smith, 2006) also posed a threat to the 
validity of the research. Participants were not primed before the start of the game and they 
were provided with minimal instructions on how to behave. However, it is possible that 
participants acted in ways that they thought the researcher desired due to repeated 
participation by some participants. 
 
 
External validity threats 
 
The results were not intended to be generalizable. However it is recognised that the threat 
of subject selection (Tredoux & Smith, 2006) is problematic since the sample consisted 
103  
only of university students who volunteered to participate (Greenberg, 1975). He does 
however also highlight the value in using homogenous groups for research is linked to 
theory development, as is the case in this research study. Threats of the generalizability to 
how the effect of group membership (IV) and ingroup bias (DV) were sampled are 
unlikely. This is because the VIAPPL enables a novel context for a history of social 
interaction to develop between participants over time. This method is indicative of how 
groups interact in real world settings and has not been used in other research instances.  
 
A further limitation deals with the explanation of the findings. The experimental context 
was designed so as to create the simplest situation for meaningful interaction. However the 
simplified and abstracted context meant that the tokens contained no real value to 
participants. It is acknowledged that the norm based explanations of the interaction do upon 
hindsight seem grandiose given that they are based on two experimental studies. Thus 
Perhaps then another more simple explanation of the findings could be that the game is 
viewed as a task that has to be performed by the participant. They are required to do 
something with a token and in the absence of any deep thought or decision process, they 
draw upon what others are doing with their tokens as they search for a basis on which to 




In hindsight, there are a number of ways that future studies of this kind can be improved. 
 
In terms of data collection, it is suggested that the VIAPPL software be upgraded to 
prevent participants participating in more than one of the same experiment. Data collection 
should be conducted over a longer time period with experiments scheduled randomly to 
allow for a less systematic sample of participants and to negate the problems associated 
with participants becoming test-savvy. Using this study as a baseline measure, further 
research studies are encouraged, in efforts to establish the reliability and validity of the 
VIAPPL as a credible (software) instrument to study social interaction. In addition to this, 
an adequate level of statistical power can be estimated to improve the research design such 
that it has low risks for Type I and Type II error. It is suggested that future research 
improve these results by improving SNA capability to obtain a more suitable model to 
explain the data. In addition, effects that assess indirect reciprocity ought to be included in 
future SNA model estimation procedures. 
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You will be required to participate in a computer game with others. 
Come to the: PsycLab (behind the Psychology building on Golf 
Road) 
Between: 7-18 April 
2012 
During: 10am/ 11:30am/ 13:00pm/ 
14:30pm 














Hello, I am Lavanya Pillay. I am a Psychology Research Masters student at the University 
of 
 




Brief outline of the study 
This research study aims to explore behaviour in a social setting. The study is an 
electronically based game, played by up to 14 players who give and receive tokens. 
 
What you will be required to do 
The study will take place in the Psych Lab.  You will be required to play a game and 
participate in a short group interview afterwards. This will take about 20 minutes. 
 
Voluntary participation 
Your participation is voluntary and you are not being forced to take part in this study. The 
choice of whether or not to participate is yours alone, and there will be no consequences of 
choosing not to take part. You may withdraw from the research at any time by telling me that 
you do not want to continue. There will be no penalties for doing so. 
Anonymity 
Although we will ask you to register as a research participant, your responses will not be 
linked with your name or any other information by which you can be identified. In other words 
you will remain entirely anonymous and your participation will remain confidential. There 
are no limits to confidentiality. 
 
Research incentive 




Who to contact if you have been harmed or have any concerns 
If you have any questions or complaints about aspects of the research or feel that you have 




Human Social Science Research Ethics 
Committee: 
 





Research Supervisors: School of Applied Human Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
Professor Kevin Durrheim 
(Durrheim@ukzn.ac.za) Dr. Mike Quayle 
(QuayleM@ukzn.ac.za) 
 
Researcher: School of Applied Human Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
 







I hereby agree to participate in research on social interaction. I am aware of what is 
required of me, and I understand that: 
 I am participating freely and without coercion. 
 
 This is a research project whose purpose is not necessarily to benefit me personally. 
 
 I will remain anonymous and my participation in the study will remain confidential. 
 
 I have a right to withdraw from the study at any time, without penalty. 
 
 I agree to the results of my participation being used for research and teaching 
purposes and for presentation in reports and at conferences. My name will not appear 
in any of these documents. 
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Appendix E: Model Specification results  
 









 (masked group) 
Outdegree (density) < 0.001 (t= 0.072) < 0.001 (t= 0.131) < 0.001 (t= 0.012) 




0.111 (t= 0.08) 0.553 (t= 0.037) 
 
Same groupno 0.094 (t= 0.082) 
 
< 0.001 (t=0.084) 
 
0.317 (t= -0.043) 
 










Outdegree (density) < 0.001 (t= -0.126) < 0.001 (t= 0.069) < 0.001 (t= 0.038) 
Reciprocity 0.490 (t= -0.017) 0.732 (t= -0.07) 0.357 (t= -0.011) 
Same groupno 0.262 (t=-0.144) 
 
< 0.001 (t=-0.093) 
 
0.848 (t= 0.003) 
 




 Trial 1 
(masked group)  
Trial 2 
(visible group) 
Trial 3  
(masked group) 
Outdegree (density) < 0.001 (t= -0.027) < 0.001 (t= 0.035) < 0.001 (t= 0.054) 





Same groupno 0.730 (t= 0.004) 
 
< 0.001 (t= -0.03) 
 
0.007 (t= 0.113) 
 










Outdegree (density) < 0.001 (t= 0.033) < 0.001 (t= 0.127) < 0.001 (t=0.057)  




0.744 (t= -0.028) 
Same groupno 0.878 (t= -0.044) 
 
0.018 (t= 0.093) 
 
0.422 (t= 0.097) 
 
























< 0.001 (t= -0.125) < 0.001 (t= -0.012) < 0.001 (t= 0.076) 
reciprocity 0.331 (t= -0.023) 0.466 (t= 0.013) 0.528 (t= 0.057) 
same groupno. < 0.001 (t= -0.079) 
 
0.634 (t= 0.049) 
 
< 0.001 (t= -
0.077) 
 













< 0.001 (t= 0.051) < 0.001 (t= 0.016) < 0.001 (t= 0.023) 
reciprocity 0.858 (t= 0.008) 0.033 (t= 0.059) 0.023 (t= -0.039) 
same groupno. 0.001 (t= 0.06) 
 
0.718 (t= -0.057) 
 
< 0.001 (t= 0.023) 
 




Outdegree (density) < 0.001 (t= 0.106) < 0.001 (t= 0.09) < 0.001 (t= 0.142) 
Reciprocity 0.794 (t= 0.135) 0.673 (t= 0.045) 0.186 (t= 0.002) 
Same groupno 0.895 (t= -0.016) 
 
< 0.001 (t= 0.036) 
 
0.413 (t= 0.059) 
 










Outdegree (density) < 0.001 (t= 0.019) < 0.001 (t= 0.036) < 0.001(t= 0.125) 
Reciprocity 0.690 (t= 0.004) 0.318 (t= 0.047) 0.675 (t= -0.018) 
Same groupno 0.522 (t= -0.054) 
 
< 0.001 (t= 0.002) 
 
0.013 (t= -0.067) 
 




 Trial 1  
(masked group) 
Trial 2  
(visible group) 
Trial 3 
(masked group)  
Outdegree (density) < 0.001 (t= 0.011) < 0.001 (t= 0.029) < 0.001 (t= 0.012) 




Same groupno 0.829 (t= 0.08) 
 
0.001 (t= -0.059) 0.894 (t= 0.022) 
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< 0.001 (t= -0.102) < 0.001 (t= 0.123) < 0.001 (t= 
=0.147) 
reciprocity 0.474 (t= 0.037) 0.951 (t= 0.27) 0.683 (t= 0.071) 
same groupno. < 0.001 (t= -0.027) 
 
0.928 (t= 0.095) 
 
< 0.001 (t= -
0.077) 
 












< 0.001 (t= -0.013) < 0.001 (t= 0.012) < 0.001 (t=0.016) 
reciprocity 0.297 (-0.108) 0.226 (t= -0.07) 0.163 (t= 0.04) 
same groupno. < 0.001 (t= -0.054) 
 
0.009 (t= -0.006) 
 
< 0.001 (t= 0.033) 
 












< 0.001 (t= -0.11) < 0.001 (t= 0.058) < 0.001 (t= 0.091) 
reciprocity 0.330 (t= 0.012) 0.427 (t= -0.018) 0.644 (t= 0.032) 
same groupno. < 0.001 (t= -0.106) 
 
0.463 (t= 0.093) 
 
0.359 (t= 0.053) 
 












< 0.001 (t= 0.136) < 0.001 (t= -0.037) < 0.001 (t= -0.09) 
reciprocity 0.737 (t= -0.057) 0.871 (t= 0.013) < 0.001 (t= -
0.094) 
same groupno. 0.048 (t= 0.01) 
 
0.971 (t= 0.051) 
 
0.012 (t= -0.024) 
 
    
Experiment VII 
n= 13  
 








< 0.001 (t= 0.015) < 0.001 (t= 0.063) < 0.001(t= -0.049) 
reciprocity 0.248 (t= 0.04) 0.958 (t= -0.02) 0.750 (t= -0.15) 
same groupno. 0.991 (t= 
0.036) 
 
< 0.001 (t= -0.046) < 0.001 (t= -
0.104) 
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Study 1: IGI condition 
Experiment I 
n= 12  
 






outdegree (density) < 0.001 (t= -0.023) < 0.001 (t= 0.014) < 0.001(t= -0.074) 
reciprocity 0.326 (t= -0.066) 0.754 (t= 0.016) 0.192 (t= 0.042) 
same groupno. 0.142 (t= 0.034) 0.935 (t= -0.048) 0.604 (t= 0.122) 








Trial 3  
(masked group) 
outdegree (density) < 0.001(t= -0.004) < 0.001(t= 0.001) < 0.001(t= 0.035) 
reciprocity 0.008 (t= -0.09) 0.040 (t= 0.032) 0.813 (t= -0.025) 















outdegree (density) < 0.001 (t= -0.053) 
 
< 0.001(t= 0.059) < 0.001(t= 0.12) 
reciprocity 0.009 (t= 0.058) 0.707 (t=0.044) 0.002 (t= -0.064) 
same groupno. 0.538 (t= -0.02) 0.264 (t= -0.084) 0.535 (t= -0.085) 








Trial 3  
(visible group) 
outdegree (density) < 0.001(t= 0.042) < 0.001(t= -0.012) < 0.001 (t= -0.036) 
reciprocity 0.436 (t= -0.006) 0.860 (t= -0.001) 0.618 (t= 0.071) 
same groupno. 0.790 (t= 0.085) 0.649 (t= -0.055) 0.717 (t= -0.02) 










outdegree (density) < 0.001 (t= 0.046) < 0.001 (t= -0.035) < 0.001 (t= -0.01) 
reciprocity 0.267 (t= 0.024) 0.177 (t= 0.023) < 0.001 (t= 0.07) 
same groupno. 0.794 (t=0.117)  0.035 (t= -0.066)  0.031 (t= 0.049) 
    
 
